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Lithium Market Becoming More Reliant on Batteries for Continued Strong Demand Growth

Posted on 18 May 2013 by Africa Business

Rise in Consumption and Future Demand Driven by Lithium-ion Batteries

Roskill estimates that rechargeable batteries accounted for 27% of global lithium consumption in 2012, up from 15% in 2007 and 8% in 2002. This end-use was responsible for 44% of the net increase in lithium consumption over the last ten years, and 70% over the last five years. In the base-case growth scenario it is expected to contribute 75% of the growth in forecast demand to 2017, when total demand for lithium is expected to reach slightly over 238,000t lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE).

Other end-uses, including glass-ceramics, greases and polymers, have also shown high rates of growth, but are predicted to moderate over the next five years as emerging economy growth slows. The lithium industry is therefore becoming more reliant on rechargeable batteries to sustain high rates of future demand growth. In addition, in the period to 2017 Roskill forecasts that the main market driver for lithium-ion batteries will gradually switch from portable consumer electronics to electric vehicles, especially hybrid variants.

Reflecting the concentration of lithium-ion battery manufacturers and associated cathode material producers in China, Japan and South Korea, the East Asia region has become an increasingly important consumer of lithium products over the last decade. In 2012, East Asia accounted for 60% of total global consumption with Europe accounting for a further 24% and North America 9%.

Growing Supply-side Pressure is Predicted to Stall Further Lithium Price Rises

Roskill’s analysis suggests that the price of technical-grade lithium carbonate, the main product produced and consumed in the lithium market, recovered some of its global economic downturn losses as the market tightened in 2012, averaging US$5,300/t CIF, up 15% from 2010. This is below the 2007 peak of US$6,500/t, but well above the US$2,000-3,000/t levels seen in the early 2000s.

Lithium extraction, which totalled over 168,000t LCE in 2012, is undertaken predominately in Australia, Chile, Argentina and China, with roughly half of lithium output from hard rock sources and half from brine. Production is dominated by Talison Lithium in Australia, SQM and Rockwood Lithium in Chile, and FMC in Argentina. Just over two-thirds of lithium minerals extracted in Australia are processed into downstream chemical products in China, where producers such as Tianqi Lithium (who recently acquired Talison to secure a captive supply of mineral feedstock) operate mineral conversion plants.

Galaxy Resources commissioned a new 17,000tpy LCE mineral conversion plant in China in 2012. Canada Lithium is in the process of commissioning a 20,000tpy LCE plant in Quebec and several existing Chinese mineral conversion plants are also expanding capacity. FMC has increased brine-based processing capacity by a third in Argentina, while nearby Orocobre is also constructing a new brine-based operation due to be completed in 2014. In addition, Rockwood Lithium plans to complete a 20,000tpy LCE expansion in Chile in 2014. Combined, this additional capacity totals just under 100,000tpy LCE, enough to meet forecast demand to 2017.

As the opening of new and expanded capacity is concentrated over the next two years, Roskill forecasts that the lithium market could witness increased competition and supply-side pressure on pricing, with prices for technical-grade lithium carbonate potentially falling back to around US$5,000/t CIF in 2014.

Lithium: Market Outlook to 2017 (12th edition)is available at a price of £4900 / US$7900 / €6200 from Roskill Information Services Ltd, 54 Russell Road, London SW19 1QL ENGLAND.

Tel: +44-(0)20-8417-0087. Fax +44-(0)20-8417-1308.

Email: info@roskill.co.uk Web: http://www.roskill.com/lithium

Note to editors

The report contains 426 pages, 245 tables and 99 figures. It provides a detailed review of the industry, with subsections on the activities of the leading producing companies. It also analyses consumption, trade and prices.

Table of Contents

Page

1.         Summary    1

2.         Lithium Mineralogy, Occurrences and Reserves    10

2.1        Occurrence of lithium    10

2.1.1      Lithium minerals    10

2.1.2      Lithium clays    12

2.1.3      Lithium brines    12

2.2        Lithium reserves    14

3.         Lithium mining and processing    16

3.1        Extraction and processing of lithium brines    17

3.1.1      Other methods of brine extraction    20

3.2        Mining and processing of lithium minerals    21

3.3        Processing lithium mineral concentrates to lithium compounds    23

3.4        Processing lithium bearing clays into lithium compounds    26

3.5        Lithium compounds and chemicals    27

3.6        Production costs    30

4.         Production of lithium    34

4.1        Lithium production by source    35

4.1.1      Production of Lithium Minerals    37

4.1.2      Production from Lithium Brines    39

4.1.3      Production of lithium compounds from mineral conversion    41

4.1.4      Production of downstream lithium chemicals    43

4.2        Outlook for production capacity of lithium to 2017    44

4.2.1      Outlook for production capacity of lithium minerals    45

4.2.2      Outlook for lithium production capacity from brines    48

4.2.3      Outlook on lithium compound production from mineral conversion    51

4.3        Forecast production of lithium to 2017    52

5.         Review of lithium producing countries    55

5.1        Afghanistan 55

5.2        Argentina 56

5.2.1      FMC Litihum (MineradelAltiplano S.A.)    58

5.2.2      ADY Resources    59

5.2.3      Lithium Americas    61

5.2.4      Galaxy Resources (Lithium 1)    66

5.2.4.1    Sal de Vida Project    66

5.2.4.2    James Bay Hard-rock Lithium Project    68

5.2.5      Orocobre Ltd.    69

5.2.5.1    Salar de Olaroz    71

5.2.5.2    Salinas Grandes (Cangrejillo)    74

5.2.5.3    Guayatoyoc Project    74

5.2.5.4    Cauchari Project    75

5.2.6      Rodinia Lithium Inc.    76

5.2.6.1    Rodinia Lithium USA 78

5.2.7      Marifil Mines Ltd.    78

5.2.8      International Lithium Corporation    79

5.2.9      Other prospects for Lithium Production    79

5.3        Australia 80

5.3.1      Talison Lithium    82

5.3.1.1    Resources and Reserves    82

5.3.1.2    Production    85

5.3.1.3    Products    86

5.3.2      Galaxy Resources Ltd.    87

5.3.2.1    Reserves and Resources    88

5.3.2.2    Production    90

5.3.3      Reed Resources Ltd.    91

5.3.4      Altura Mining Ltd.    92

5.3.5      Artemis Resources    93

5.3.6      Amerilithium    93

5.3.7      Reward Minerals    93

5.4        Austria 93

5.5        Belgium 94

5.6        Bolivia 96

5.6.1      Salar de Uyuni 97

5.6.2      Salar de Coipasa    99

5.6.3      New World Resource Corp.    99

5.7        Brazil 100

5.7.1      CompanhiaBrasileira de Litio    102

5.7.2      Arqueana de Minérios e Metais Ltda.    103

5.7.3      Advance Metallurgical Group (AMG)    104

5.8        Canada 104

5.8.1      Lithium resources in Canada 105

5.8.2      Canadian trade in lithium    107

5.8.3      Past producers of lithium in Canada 108

5.8.3.1    Tantalum Mining Corp. of Canada Ltd. (TANCO)    108

5.8.4      Potential new producers of lithium in Canada 109

5.8.4.1    Canada Lithium Corp.    109

5.8.4.2    Nemaska Lithium    112

5.8.4.3    Avalon Rare Metals Inc.    115

5.8.4.4    Perilya Limited    116

5.8.4.5    Rock Tech Lithium Inc.    117

5.8.4.6    Critical Elements Corporation    120

5.8.4.7    Glen Eagle Resources Inc.    120

5.8.4.8    Aben Resources Ltd.    121

5.8.4.9    Toxco Inc. Canada 122

5.8.4.10   Other Canadian Lithium Projects    122

5.9        Chile 126

5.9.1      Chilean lithium reserves    127

5.9.2      Chilean lithium production    127

5.9.3      Special Lithium Operations Contracts (CEOLs)    128

5.9.4      SociedadQuímica y Minera    129

5.9.4.1    Reserves and Resources    130

5.9.4.2    Production    131

5.9.4.3    Products    132

5.9.4.4    Markets    134

5.9.4.5    Exports    135

5.9.5      Rockwood Litihum (Salar de Atacama and La Negra Plant)    136

5.9.6      Simbalik Group    138

5.9.7      Li3 Energy Inc.    139

5.9.7.1    Maricunga Property    139

5.9.7.2    Li3 Energy Peruvian Projects    141

5.9.8      First Potash Corp.    141

5.9.9      CODELCO    142

5.9.10 Mammoth Energy Group Inc.    142

5.9.11 Lomiko Metals Inc.    143

5.9.12 Errázuriz Lithium    143

5.9.13 Exports of litihum from Chile 143

5.10       China 146

5.10.1     Chinese reserves of lithium    147

5.10.1.1   Lithium Mineral Reserves    147

5.10.1.2   Lithium Brine Reserves    148

5.10.2     Production of lithium    149

5.10.2.1   Mineral Production    150

5.10.2.2   Brine Production    151

5.10.2.3   Lithium Chemicals and Metal Production    152

5.10.3     Chinese trade in lithium    155

5.10.4     Chinese lithium brine producers    157

5.10.4.1   Tibet Lithium New Technology Development Co. Ltd.    157

5.10.4.2   Qinghai CITIC Guoan Technology Development Co. Ltd.    159

5.10.4.3   Qinghai Salt Lake Industry Co. Ltd.    160

5.10.4.4   Qinghai Lanke Lithium Industry Co. Ltd.    161

5.10.4.5   Tibet Sunrise Mining Development Ltd.    162

5.10.4.6   China MinMetals Non-Ferrous Metals Co. Ltd    163

5.10.5     Chinese lithium mineral producers    163

5.10.5.1   Fujian Huamin Import & Export Co. Ltd.    163

5.10.5.2   YichunHuili Industrial Co. Ltd.    164

5.10.5.3   GanZiRongda Lithium Co., Ltd.    164

5.10.5.4   Sichuan HidiliDexin Mineral Industry    165

5.10.5.5   Xinjiang Non-Ferrous Metals (Group) Ltd.    166

5.10.6     Chinese lithium mineral producers with mineral conversion capacity    166

5.10.6.1   Jiangxi Western Resources Lithium Industry    166

5.10.6.2   Sichuan Aba Guangsheng Lithium Co. Ltd.    167

5.10.6.3   Minfeng Lithium Co. Ltd.    167

5.10.6.4   Sichuan Ni&CoGuorun New Materials Co. Ltd.    168

5.10.7     Chinese mineral conversion plants    169

5.10.7.1   Sichuan Tianqi Lithium Shareholding Co. Ltd.    169

5.10.7.2   Galaxy Resources (Jiangsu Lithium Carbonate Plant)    171

5.10.7.3   General Lithium (Haimen) Corp.    172

5.10.7.4   China Non-Ferrous Metal Import & Export Xinjiang Corp.    173

5.10.7.5   Sichuan State Lithium Materials Co. Ltd.    174

5.10.7.6   Jiangxi Ganfeng Lithium Co. Ltd.    174

5.10.7.7   Sichuan Chenghehua Lithium Technology Co. Ltd.    176

5.10.8     Chinese lithium chemical producers    176

5.10.9     Specialist lithium bromide producers    177

5.10.10 Specialist lithium metal producers    178

5.11       Czech Republic 179

5.12       Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)    179

5.13       Finland 180

5.13.1     KeliberOy    180

5.13.2     Nortec Minerals Corp.    181

5.13.3     Leviäkangas Deposit    182

5.13.4     Syväjärvi Deposit    182

5.14       France 182

5.15       Germany 184

5.15.1     Rockwood Lithium (Langelsheim Plant)    185

5.15.2     Helm AG    185

5.15.3     Lithium exploration in Germany 185

5.16       Greece 186

5.17       India 186

5.17.1     FMC India Private Ltd.    188

5.17.2     Rockwood Lithium    188

5.18       Ireland 189

5.19       Israel 189

5.20       Japan 190

5.21       Kazakhstan 192

5.22       Mali 193

5.23       Mexico 193

5.23.1     LitioMex S.A. de C.V. (PieroSutti S.A. de C.V.)    193

5.23.2     First Potash Corp. (Mexico)    195

5.23.3     Bacanora Minerals Ltd.    195

5.24       Mongolia 196

5.25       Mozambique 196

5.26       Namibia 197

5.27       Netherlands 198

5.28       Portugal 199

5.28.1     SociedadMineira de Pegmatites    200

5.29       Russia 200

5.29.1     Russian Lithium Reserves and Resources    201

5.29.2     Russian Lithium Production    202

5.29.2.1   JSC Chemical and Metallurgical Plant    202

5.29.2.2   JSC Novosibirsk Chemical Concentration Plant    203

5.29.3     Russian Imports and Exports of Lithium    204

5.30       Serbia    205

5.31       South Africa 206

5.32       South Korea 206

5.33       Spain 207

5.33.1     Minera Del Duero 208

5.33.2     Solid Resources Ltd.    209

5.34       Taiwan 209

5.35       Tajikistan 210

5.36       Turkey 210

5.37       UK    211

5.38       Ukraine 212

5.39       USA 212

5.39.1     Trade in lithium to/from the USA 213

5.39.2     Rockwood Lithium (Chemetall Group)    214

5.39.2.1   Silver Peak, Kings Mountain and New Johnsonville operations (USA)    215

5.39.3     FMC Corporation    216

5.39.3.1   FMC Lithium    217

5.39.3.2   Other FMC Corporation facilities    218

5.39.4     Western Lithium Corporation    219

5.39.5     Simbol Materials Corp.    222

5.39.6     Albemarle Corporation    223

5.39.7     Toxco Inc.    223

5.39.8     AusAmerican Mining Corp. Ltd.    223

5.39.9     Other USA Companies    224

5.40       Uzbekistan 226

5.41       Zimbabwe 226

5.41.1     Bikita Minerals Ltd    227

5.41.2     Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation    228

5.41.3     Premier African Minerals    228

5.41.4     Cape Range Ltd.    229

6.         International trade in lithium    230

6.1        Trade in lithium carbonate    230

6.2        Trade in lithium hydroxide and oxides    233

6.3        Trade in lithium chloride    236

6.4        Trade in mineral concentrates    237

6.5        Trade in lithium brines    238

7.         Consumption of lithium    239

7.1        Consumption of lithium by end-use    239

7.2        Consumption of lithium by country/region    243

7.3        Consumption of lithium by product    245

7.4        Outlook for consumption of lithium by end-use    247

7.5        Outlook for lithium consumption by product    251

8.         Use of lithium in rechargeable batteries    253

8.1        Types of rechargeable batteries    253

8.1.1      Lithium-ion batteries    254

8.1.2      Lithium metal polymer batteries    256

8.1.3      Lithium-sulphur batteries    256

8.1.4      Lithium-air batteries    258

8.1.5      NiMH and NiCd batteries    258

8.2        Production of rechargeable batteries    258

8.2.1      Producers of rechargeable lithium batteries    261

8.2.2      Producers of nickel metal hydride batteries    262

8.3        Production of rechargeable lithium battery materials    262

8.3.1      Producers of rechargeable lithium battery materials    264

8.3.1.1    Cathode materials    264

8.3.1.2    Electrolyte salts    267

8.3.1.3    Anode materials    268

8.4        Consumption of rechargeable lithium batteries    268

8.4.1      Computing, communication and consumer (3C) market    269

8.4.2      Power devices and motive power    270

8.4.3      Heavy duty applications    272

8.4.4      Transportation    272

8.5        Consumption of NiMH and NiCd batteries    274

8.6        Consumption of lithium in rechargeable batteries    274

8.7        Outlook for demand for rechargeable batteries    278

8.8        Outlook for consumption of lithium in rechargeable batteries    281

9.         Use of lithium in ceramics    284

9.1        Use of lithium in ceramics    284

9.2        Production and consumption of ceramics    286

9.2.1      Ceramic tiles    287

9.2.1.1    Producers of ceramic tiles    289

9.2.2      Sanitaryware    291

9.2.2.1    Producers of sanitaryware    291

9.2.3      Tableware    293

9.2.3.1    Producers of tableware    294

9.2.4      Cookware and bakeware    295

9.3        Production and consumption of glazes and enamels    295

9.3.1      Producers of glazes and enamels    297

9.4        Outlook for ceramics production and consumption    298

9.5        Consumption of lithium in ceramics    299

9.5.1      Outlook for lithium demand in ceramics    300

10.        Use of lithium in glass-ceramics    302

10.1       Use of lithium in glass-ceramics    302

10.2       Production and consumption of glass-ceramics    304

10.2.1     Producers of glass-ceramics    305

10.3       Consumption of lithium in glass-ceramics    306

11.        Use of lithium in lubricating grease    309

11.1       Types of lubricating grease    309

11.2       Production of grease    311

11.2.1     Producers of lithium grease    314

11.3       Consumption of lithium greases    317

11.4       Consumption of lithium in greases    320

11.4.1     Outlook for demand for lithium in greases    321

12.        Use of lithium in glass    323

12.1       Use of lithium in glass    323

12.2       Production and consumption of glass    325

12.2.1     Container glass    326

12.2.2     Fibreglass    329

12.2.3     Speciality glass    330

12.3       Consumption of lithium in glass    330

12.3.1     Outlook for demand for lithium in glass    331

13.        Use of lithium in metallurgical powders    333

13.1       Continuous casting    333

13.1.1     Producers of continuous casting mould powders    334

13.1.2     Continually cast steel production    334

13.1.3     Consumption of continuous casting mould powders    335

13.1.4     Consumption of lithium in continuous casting mould powders    335

13.2       Traditional metal casting    337

13.3       Outlook for demand for lithium in casting powders    337

14.        Use of lithium in polymers    338

14.1       Types of polymers    338

14.2       Production of polymers    340

14.2.1     Producers of polymers    342

14.3       Consumption of polymers    344

14.4       Consumption of lithium in polymers    348

14.4.1     Outlook for lithium demand in polymers    348

15.        Use of lithium in air treatment    350

15.1       Absorption chillers    350

15.1.1     Production of absorption chillers    351

15.1.2     Producers of adsorption chillers    352

15.1.3     Producers of lithium bromide for absorption chillers    354

15.1.4     Consumption of lithium in absorption chillers    356

15.2       Dehumidification    357

15.2.1     Production of desiccant dehumidification systems    358

15.2.2     Producers of desiccant dehumidification systems    358

15.2.3     Consumption of lithium in desiccant dehumidifiers    359

15.3       Air purification    359

15.5       Outlook for demand for lithium in air treatment    360

16.        Use of lithium in primary batteries    362

16.1       Types of primary batteries    362

16.2       Production of lithium primary batteries    365

16.2.1     Producers of lithium primary batteries    367

16.3       Trade in primary batteries    369

16.4       Production of primary lithium battery materials    370

16.4.1     Producers of lithium primary battery anodes    371

16.5       Consumption of lithium primary batteries    373

16.5.1     Outlook for primary lithium battery consumption    374

16.6       Consumption of lithium in primary batteries    374

16.6.1     Outlook for demand for lithium in primary batteries    377

17.        Use of lithium in aluminium smelting    378

17.1       Process of aluminium smelting    378

17.2       Consumers of lithium in aluminium smelting    380

17.3       Consumption of lithium in aluminium smelting    382

17.3.1     Outlook for lithium demand in aluminium smelting    383

18.        Minor end-uses for lithium    385

18.1       Sanitization    385

18.2       Organic synthesis    386

18.3       Construction    388

18.4       Alkyd resins    388

18.5       Alloys    391

18.5.1     Aluminium-lithium alloy    391

18.5.1.1   Producers of aluminium-lithium alloys    394

18.5.1.2   Applications for aluminium-lithium alloys    395

18.5.1.3   Consumption of lithium in aluminium-lithium alloys    398

18.5.1.4   Outlook for demand for lithium in aluminium-lithium alloys    398

18.5.2     Magnesium-lithium alloy    400

18.6       Electronics    400

18.7       Analytical agents    402

18.8       Dyestuffs    402

18.9       Metallurgy    402

18.10      Photographic industry    402

18.11      Welding fluxes    402

18.12      Electrochromic glass    403

18.13      Pharmaceuticals    403

18.13.1    Producers of lithium-based pharmaceuticals    404

18.13.2    Production and consumption of lithium-based pharmaceuticals    404

18.13.3    Consumption of lithium in pharmaceuticals    405

18.14      Speciality lithium inorganics    405

19.        Prices of lithium    408

19.1       Technical-grade lithium mineral prices    409

19.2       Chemical-grade spodumene prices    412

19.3       Technical-grade lithium carbonate prices    413

19.4       Battery-grade lithium carbonate    415

19.5       Technical-grade lithium hydroxide prices    416

19.6       Battery-grade lithium hydroxide prices    418

19.7       Lithium chloride prices    419

19.8       Lithium metal prices    420

19.9       Outlook for lithium prices    421

19.9.1     Technical-grade lithium carbonate prices    421

19.9.2     Battery-grade lithium carbonate prices    424

19.9.3     Technical-grade lithium mineral prices    425

19.9.4     Chemical-grade spodumene prices    425

19.9.5     Lithium hydroxide prices    426

List of Tables

Page

Table 1: World: Forecast nominal and real prices for technical-grade lithium carbonate, 2012 to 2017     8

Table 2: Properties of lithium    10

Table 3: Significant lithium minerals    11

Table 4: Major lithium bearing smectite group members    12

Table 5: Brine concentrations at selected deposits    13

Table 6: Lithium reserves by country     15

Table 7: Composition of standard lithium concentrates     22

Table 8: Specifications for lithium carbonate produced by SQM and Rockwood Lithium     28

Table 9: Specifications for lithium carbonate produced by other suppliers     28

Table 10: Battery grade lithium hydroxide product specifications of major producers      29

Table 11: Production of lithium by country and company, 2005 to 2012     35

Table 12: Capacity and production of lithium minerals by company, 2011 to 2012     39

Table 13: Capacity and production of lithium compounds from brine-based producers, 2011 to 2012     40

Table 14: Capacity and production of lithium mineral converters, 2011 to 2012     42

Table 15: Production of lithium compounds from minerals, 2005 to 2012     43

Table 16: Planned expansions as reported by existing lithium mineral producers to 2017     46

Table 17: Potential lithium mineral producers to 2017     47

Table 18: Planned expansions by existing lithium brine producers to 2017     49

Table 19: Potential new lithium brine projects to 2017     50

Table 20: Planned expansions to production capacity for existing and potential mineral conversion plants     51

Table 21: Afghanistan: Spodumene bearing pegmatites identified in Nuristan, Badakhshan, Nangarhar, Lagman and Uruzgan provinces    55

Table 22: Argentina: Exports of lithium carbonate, 2004 to 2012     57

Table 23: Argentina: Exports of lithium chloride, 2004 to 2012     58

Table 24:FMC: Brine reserves at the Salar del Hombre Muerto    58

Table 25: FMC: Production and value of lithium carbonate and chloride at the Salta plant, Argentina 2005 to 2012     59

Table 26: ADY Resources: Salar del Rincón reserve estimation, 2007    60

Table 27: Lithium Americas: Lithium and potash resource estimation for the Cauchari-Olaroz property, July 2012 61

Table 28: Lithium Americas: Lithium and potash reserve estimation for the Cauchari-Olaroz property, July 2012 61

Table 29: Lithium Americas: Estimated capital costs for Lithium carbonate production at the Cauchari-Olaroz project, July 2012 63

Table 30: Lithium Americas: Estimated operating costs for Cauchari-Olaroz project, July 2012 65

Table 31: Galaxy Resources: Resource estimation for the Sal de Vida project, January 2012 66

Table 32: Galaxy Resources: Reserve estimate for the Sal de Vida project, April 2013 67

Table 33: Galaxy Resources: Estimated capital costs for Sal de Vida project, October 2011 68

Table 34: Orocobre: Agreements between Borax Argentina and other lithium companies    70

Table 35: Orocobre: Resource estimation for the Salar de Olaroz project, May 2011 71

Table 36: Orocobre: Assay results of first battery grade lithium carbonate product from the Orocobre pilot plant    72

Table 37: Orocobre: Capital costs for 16,400tpy LCE operation at the Salar de Olaroz, May 2011 73

Table 38: Orocobre: Operating costs for battery grade lithium carbonate for the Salar de Olaroz, May 2011 73

Table 39: Orocobre: Resource estimation for the Salinas Grande project, April 2012 74

Table 40: Orocobre: Averaged assay results from pit sampling of brine at the Guayatoyoc project    75

Table 41: Orocobre: Maiden resource estimation for the Salar de Cauchari project, October 2012 75

Table 42: Rodinia Lithium: Salar de Diablillos resource estimation, March 2011 76

Table 43: Rodinia Lithium: Estimated capital costs for the Salar de Diablillos project    77

Table 44: Rodinia Lithium: Estimated operating costs for the Salar de Diablillos project    77

Table 45: Rodinia Lithium: Other Argentine lithium projects    78

Table 46: Australia: Exports of mineral substances NES (excl. natural micaceous iron oxides) 2005 to 2012     81

Table 47: Australia: Unit value of mineral substances NES (excl. natural micaeous iron oxides) 2005 to 2011     81

Table 48: Talison Lithium: Resource estimation for the Greenbushes deposit, December 2012 83

Table 49: Talison Lithium: Lithium mineral reserve estimation for the Greenbushes deposit,  December 2012    83

Table 50: Talison Lithium: Li, K and Na content of brines, Salares 7 project saline lakes 1998, (ppm)    84

Table 51: Talison Lithium: Li, K and Na content of brines, Salares 7 project saline lakes 2009, (ppm)    84

Table 52: Talison Lithium: Production and sales of lithium mineral concentrates and ores, 2005 to 2011     85

Table 53: Talison Lithium: Standard lithium mineral concentrate product specifications    87

Table 54: Galaxy Resources: Mount Cattlin mineral resource estimate, February 2011 89

Table 55: Galaxy Resources: Mount Cattlin mineral reserve estimate, December 2011 89

Table 56: Galaxy Resources: James Bay mineral resource estimate, November 2010 89

Table 57: Galaxy Resources: Mt. Cattlin mine and plant production, Q3 2010 – Q4 2011    90

Table 58: Reed Resources : Mt Marion resource estimation, July 2011 91

Table 59: Altura: Mineral resource estimation for the Pilgangoora lithium project, October 2012 92

Table 60: Belgium: Trade is lithium carbonate, 2005 to 2012     95

Table 61: Belgium: Trade in lithium hydroxide and oxide, 2005 to 2012     96

Table 62: Salars and Lagunas in Bolivia identified by Gerencia Nacional de Recursos Evaporíticos    97

Table 63: Results of sampling campaign by Université de Liegé and Universidad Tecnica de Oruro at the Salar de Coipasa, 2002    99

Table 64: Assay data for brines intercepted during drilling at the Pastos Grandes Salar, August 2011 100

Table 65: Brazil: Lithium resource estimation by mineral type, 2009    101

Table 66: Brazil: Trade in lithium chemicals and concentrates, 2004 to 2011     102

Table 67: CBL: Production of lithium concentrates and lithium salts, 2005 to 2011    102

Table 68: Arqueana: Production of lithium concentrates, 2008 to 2011    103

Table 69: Canada: Resources estimations for Canadian lithium projects    106

Table 70: Canada: Imports and exports of lithium compounds 2005 to 2012     108

Table 71: TANCO: Spodumene concentrate production 2005 to 2011     109

Table 72: Canada Lithium: Resource estimation for the Quebec Lithium project, December 2011 109

Table 73: Canada Lithium: Reserve estimation for the Quebec Lithium project, December 2011 110

Table 74: Canada Lithium: Estimated capital expenditure for Quebec Lithium project (inc.LiOH and Na2SO4 plant costs), October 2012 111

Table 75 :Canada Lithium: Estimated operating expenditure for Quebec Lithium project, October 2012 111

Table 76: Nemaska Lithium: Resource estimation for the Whabouchi project, June 2011 113

Table 77: Nemaska Lithium: Reserve estimation for the Whabouchi project, October 2012 113

Table 78: Avalon Rare Metals: Separation Rapids NI 43-101 resource and reserve estimation, 1999    116

Table 79: Perilya Ltd: Mineral resource estimation for Moblan deposit, May 2011 117

Table 80: Rock Tech Lithium: Structure of the Georgia Lake project, November 2011 118

Table 81: Rock Tech Lithium: Updated mineral resource estimation for Georgia Lake project, July 2012 119

Table 82: Glen Eagle: Resource estimation for Authier lithium property, January 2012 121

Table 83: Canada: Lithium exploration projects in Canada with uncompleted scoping studies or PFS in October 2012 122

Table 84: Chile: Lithium carbonate, chloride and hydroxide production, 2004 to 2011     128

Table 85: Chile: Special operating licence bidders for the September 2012 auction    129

Table 86: SQM: Majority shareholders of SQM as of December 31st 2011    130

Table 87: SQM: Reserves within brines at the Salar de Atacama project    131

Table 88: SQM: Production, revenue and value per tonne of lithium compounds, 2003 to 2012    132

Table 89: SQM: Specifications for lithium carbonate     133

Table 90: SQM: Specifications for lithium hydroxide     134

Table 91: RWL: Gross tonnage, value and unit value of lithium carbonate exports, 2006 to 2012    137

Table 92: RWL: Gross tonnage, value and unit value of lithium chloride exports, 2006 to 2012    138

Table 93: Li3 Energy: Resource estimation for the Maricunga property, April 2012 140

Table 94: Chile: Exports of lithium carbonate by destination, 2004 to 2011    144

Table 95: Chile: Lithium carbonate export volume, value and unit price by company, 2005 to 2011    144

Table 96: Chile: Lithium chloride exports by destination, 2004 to 2012    145

Table 97: Chile: Lithium hydroxide exports by destination, 2004 to 2012    146

Table 98: China : Estimated resources and reserves of both lithium mineral and brine operations and projects    148

Table 99: China: Production of lithium, 2003 to 2012    149

Table 100: China: Producers of lithium minerals, 2011 to 2012    151

Table 101: China: Production and capacity of Chinese lithium brine operations, 2011    152

Table 102: China: Mineral conversion plant production and production capacity, 2012    154

Table 103: China: Producers of battery grade lithium metal, 2012    154

Table 104: China: Imports and exports of lithium carbonate, 2005 to 2012     155

Table 105: China: Imports and exports of lithium chloride, 2005 to 2012     156

Table 106: China: Imports and exports of lithium hydroxide, 2005 to 2012     157

Table 107: China: Imports and exports of lithium oxide, 2005 to 2012     157

Table 108: Tibet Lithium New Technology Development: Lithium production, 2010 to 2012    158

Table 109: Qinghai CITIC: Lithium carbonate production, 2008 to 2012     160

Table 110:  Dangxiongcuo reserve estimation from 2006 qualifying report    163

Table 111: Jiangxi Western Resources: Lithium Production, 2010    167

Table 112: Sichuan Tianqi: Production and sales of lithium products, 2010 to 2011     169

Table 113: Galaxy Resources: Battery grade lithium carbonate chemical specifications    172

Table 114: KeliberOy: Claims, reservation and mining concessions for lithium projects held by Keliber in Finland, 2012    181

Table 115: France: Imports and exports of lithium carbonate, 2005 to 2012     183

Table 116: France: Imports and exports of lithium hydroxide and oxide, 2005 to 2012     184

Table 117: Germany: Imports and exports of lithium carbonate, 2005 to 2012     184

Table 118: India: Trade in lithium hydroxide and oxides, 2005 to 2012     187

Table 119: India: Trade in lithium carbonate, 2005 to 2012     187

Table 120: India: Producers of lithium chemicals    188

Table 121: Japan: Trade in lithium carbonate, 2005 to 2012     190

Table 122: Japan: Trade in lithium hydroxide and oxide, 2005 to 2012     191

Table 123: Mexico: LitioMex S.A. concessions and resource estimations    194

Table 124: Namibia: Production of lithium minerals, 1990 to 1998     197

Table 125: Netherlands: Trade in lithium carbonate, 2005 to 2012     198

Table 126: Netherlands: Trade in lithium hydroxide and oxide, 2005 to 2012     199

Table 127: SociedadMineira de Pegmatites: Production of Lithium, 2004 to 2012     200

Table 128: Russia: Deposits of lithium    201

Table 129: Russia: Imports of lithium carbonate, 2002 to 2012     204

Table 130: Russia: Exports of lithium hydroxide, 2002 to 2012     204

Table 131: Russia: Imports of lithium hydroxide, 2002 to 2012     205

Table 132: South Korea: Trade in lithium carbonate, 2005 to 2012     207

Table 133: South Korea: Trade in lithium hydroxide, 2005 to 2012     207

Table 134: Spain: Imports of lithium compounds, 2005 to 2012     208

Table 135: Minera Del Duero: Production of lepidolite in Spain, 2003 to 2011     208

Table 136: Inferred mineral resource estimation for the Doade-Presquerias project, October 2011 209

Table 137: Taiwan: Imports of lithium carbonate, 2005 to 2012     210

Table 138: UK: Imports of lithium carbonate and lithium hydroxides and oxides 2005 to 2012     211

Table 139: USA: Imports and exports of lithium carbonate 2005 to 2012     213

Table 140: USA: Imports and exports of lithium oxide and hydroxide 2005 to 2012     214

Table 141: FMC: Product range    218

Table 142: WLC: Resource estimation for the Kings Valley project, January 2012 219

Table 143: WLC: Reserve estimation for the Kings Valley project, December 2011 220

Table 144: WLC: Estimated operating and capital costs for ‘Case 1’ and ‘Case 2’ scenarios at the Kings Valley project.    221

Table 145: USA: Lithium exploration projects yet to reach scoping study or PFS stage in development    224

Table 146: Zimbabwe: South African imports of mineral substances from Zimbabwe, 2005 to 2012     227

Table 147: Bikita Minerals: Mine production and lithium content 2003 to 2011    228

Table 148: World: Total exports of lithium carbonate, 2005 to 2012     230

Table 149: World: Total imports of lithium carbonate, 2005 to 2012     232

Table 150: World: Total exports of lithium hydroxide and oxide, 2005 to 2012     234

Table 151: World: Total imports of lithium hydroxide and oxide, 2005 to 2012     236

Table 152: World: Major importers and exporters of lithium chloride, 2005 to 2012     237

Table 153: World: Exports of lithium minerals by major lithium mineral producing nations (excl. China), 2005 to 2012     238

Table 154: Chile: Exports of lithium chloride brine1 by SQM to China, 2005 to 2012     238

Table 155: World: Consumption of lithium by end-use, 2002, 2007 and 2012    240

Table 156: World: Estimated consumption of lithium by country/region, 2002, 2007 and 2012     244

Table 157: World: Consumption of lithium by end-use, by product, 2012    246

Table 158: World: Forecast consumption of lithium by end-use, 2012 to 2017     248

Table 159: Japan: Producers of lithium-ion battery cathode materials, 2012    265

Table 160: South Korea: Producers of lithium-ion battery cathode materials, 2012    265

Table 161: China: Producers of lithium-ion battery cathode materials, 2012    266

Table 162: World: Producers of lithium salts for electrolytes, 2012    267

Table 163: World: Lithium battery consumption in 3C products, 2012    269

Table 164: World: Lithium battery consumption in power devices and motive power, 2012    271

Table 165: World: Lithium battery consumption in heavy duty applications, 2012    272

Table 166: World: Lithium battery consumption in transport applications, 2012    274

Table 167: World: Lithium consumption in rechargeable lithium batteries end-use, 2012    275

Table 168: World: Lithium consumption in NiMH and NiCd batteries, 2012    275

Table 169: World: Consumption of lithium in rechargeable batteries by type, 2007 to 2012     277

Table 170: Japan: Consumption of lithium in rechargeable batteries, 2007 to 2012     277

Table 171: World: Consumption of lithium in rechargeable batteries by country, 2007 to 2012     278

Table 172: World: Rechargeable lithium battery demand by market, 2012 and 2017    278

Table 173: World: Comparison of EV production estimates in 2017 by industry consultant    280

Table 174: World: Forecast rechargeable battery consumption in EVs, 2017    281

Table 175: World: Lithium consumption in rechargeable lithium batteries by end-use, 2017    281

Table 176: World: Forecast demand for lithium in rechargeable lithium batteries, 2012 to 2017     282

Table 177: World: Forecast demand for lithium in rechargeable batteries by battery type, 2012 to 2017     282

Table 178: World: Forecast demand for lithium in rechargeable batteries by product type, 2007 to 2012     283

Table 179: Typical whiteware body compositions     285

Table 180: World: Production of ceramic tiles by leading country, 2007 to 2012     287

Table 181: World: Consumption of ceramic tiles by leading countries, 2007 to 2011     289

Table 182: World: Leading ceramic tile manufacturing companies, 2010    290

Table 183: World: Leading sanitaryware manufacturing companies, 2010    292

Table 184: World: Consumption of lithium in ceramics, 2012    300

Table 185: World: Consumption of lithium in ceramics, 2007 to 2012     300

Table 186: World: Forecast demand for lithium in ceramics, 2012 to 2017     301

Table 187: Glass-ceramic matrices    302

Table 188: Compositions of commercial glass-ceramics    303

Table 189: Japan: Consumption of lithium carbonate in glass-ceramics, 2007 to 2012     306

Table 190: World: Consumption of lithium in glass-ceramics by end-use and product type, 2012     307

Table 191: World: Consumption of lithium in glass-ceramics, 2007 to 2012     307

Table 192: World: Forecast demand for lithium in glass-ceramics, 2012 to 2017     308

Table 193: Properties of commercial greases    311

Table 194: World: Producers of lubricating grease    315

Table 195: World: Forecast demand for lithium in greases, 2012 to 2017    322

Table 196: Typical batch compositions for glass by type     323

Table 197: Main sources of lithium used in glass    324

Table 198: EU: Production of glass by type, 1998 to 2012     328

Table 199: USA: Production of container glass, 1999 to 2008    328

Table 200: Typical chemical composition of types of textile-grade fibreglass     329

Table 201: World: Estimated consumption of lithium in glass, 2012     331

Table 202: World: Consumption of lithium in glass, 2007 to 2012     331

Table 203: World: Forecast demand for lithium in glass, 2012 to 2017     332

Table 204: World: Consumption of lithium in continuous casting mould powders, 2007 to 2012     336

Table 205: Japan: Consumption of lithium in fluxes, 2007 to 2012     336

Table 206: World: Forecast demand for lithium in casting powders, 2012 to 2017     337

Table 207: Microstructure of different types of polybutadienes    339

Table 208: World: Producers of SSBR, BR and SBC, 2012    343

Table 209: World: Planned new/expanded SBR, BR and SBC plants    344

Table 210: World: Forecast demand for lithium in synthetic rubber and thermoplastics, 2011 to 2017    349

Table 211: World: Capacity for lithium bromide production, end-2012     355

Table 212: Japan: Consumption of lithium bromide, 2007 to 2012    356

Table 213: World: Forecast demand for lithium in air treatment, 2012 to 2017    361

Table 214: Characteristics of primary lithium batteries    363

Table 215: Japan: Production of primary batteries by type, 1998 to 2012     367

Table 216: World: Trade in lithium primary batteries, 2007 to 2011     369

Table 217: Primary lithium batteries and their material compositions    371

Table 218: Specifications for battery-grade lithium metal     371

Table 219: World: Producers of battery-grade lithium metal, end-2012    372

Table 220: Japan: Consumption of lithium in primary lithium batteries, 2007 to 2012    375

Table 221: Japan: Unit consumption of lithium in primary batteries, 2007 to 2012    375

Table 222: World: Imports of battery-grade lithium metal, 2007 to 2012    376

Table 223: World: Forecast demand for lithium in primary batteries, 2012 to 2017    377

Table 224: Effects of additives and temperatures on properties of molten cryolite    379

Table 225: World: Aluminium smelters using Söderberg technology, end-2012    381

Table 226: World: Forecast demand for lithium in aluminium smelting, 2012 to 2017     384

Table 227: World: Consumption of lithium in other end-uses, 2007, 2012 and 2017     385

Table 228: Examples of uses for lithium in organic synthesis    387

Table 229: Physical properties of Al-Li alloys    392

Table 230: Chemical composition of Al-Li alloys     393

Table 231: Use of Al-Li alloys in selected aircraft    397

Table 232: World: Forecast demand for lithium in aluminium-lithium alloys, 2012 to 2017    399

Table 233: Properties of lithium niobate and lithium tantalite    401

Table 234: Applications for SAW components    401

Table 235: Applications for speciality inorganic lithium compounds    406

Table 236: Prices of lithium minerals, 2000-2013     410

Table 237: Comparison of prices for lithium minerals and carbonate, 2004 to 2012    411

Table 238: Comparison of prices for chemical-grade spodumene concentrate and lithium carbonate, 2004 to 2012    412

Table 239: Comparison of technical- and battery- grade lithium carbonate prices, 2004 to 2012     416

Table 240: Average values of exports/imports of lithium oxides and hydroxides by leading exporting/importing country, 2004 to 2012     417

Table 241: Average values of exports of lithium chloride by leading producing country, 2004 to 2012    420

Table 242: Average values of exports of lithium metal by leading producing country, 2004 to 2012    421

Table 243: World: Forecast nominal and real prices for technical-grade lithium carbonate, 2012 to 2017     423

Table 244: World: Forecast nominal prices for technical-grade lithium carbonate and chemical-grade lithium minerals, 2012 to 2017     425

Table 245: World: Forecast nominal prices for technical-grade lithium carbonate and technical-grade lithium hydroxide, 2012 to 2017     426

List of Figures

Figure 1: Lithium product flow chart and main end-uses, 2012     1

Figure 2: Consumption of lithium by end-use, 2000 to 2012     2

Figure 3: Production of lithium by country, 2000 to 2012     4

Figure 4: Price history of lithium carbonate, 1990 to 2012    6

Figure 5: World: Forecast real prices for technical-grade lithium carbonate, 2012 to 2017     9

Figure 6: Overview of lithium production    16

Figure 7: Extraction and processing of brines from the Salar de Atacama, Chile and Silver Peak, Nevada by Rockwood Lithium    18

Figure 8: Flow sheet showing the processing of brines at Salar de Carmen by SQM    19

Figure 9: Simplified flow sheet of the Li SX™ method patented by Bateman Lithium Projects    21

Figure 10: Simplified mineral concentrate production flow sheet for a typical hard rock lithium operation    22

Figure 11: Simplified flow sheet for lithium carbonate production from spodumene mineral concentrate using the acid-roast method    24

Figure 12: Simplified flow sheet for lithium hydroxide and lithium hydroxide monohydrate production from spodumene mineral concentrate using the lime-roast method    25

Figure 13: Simplified flow sheet for lithium carbonate production from hectorite clay developed by Western Lithium    27

Figure 14: Mining and milling costs for hard rock lithium mineral operations/projects    31

Figure 15: Lithium carbonate cash operating costs, 2012    32

Figure 16:  Potential new producers production costs    33

Figure 17: World: Production of lithium by country, 2000 to 2012     34

Figure 18: Production of lithium from mineral and brine sources, 2005 to 2012     37

Figure 19: Production of lithium minerals by company, 2012     38

Figure 20: Production of lithium from brines by country, 2005 to 2012     40

Figure 21: Planned production capacity and consumption for lithium, 2012 to 2017     45

Figure 22: Forecast production and consumption of lithium, 2012 to 2017     54

Figure 23: Pilot plant flow sheet developed for Lithium Americas at SGS Mineral Services    62

Figure 24: Brazil: Production of Lithium products 2005 to 2010     101

Figure 25: SQM: Lithium sales by destination 2011, 2009, 2007 and 2005     135

Figure 26: SQM: Destination of lithium carbonate exports, 2006 to 2011     136

Figure 27: China: Location of mineral conversion and lithium chemical/metal plants in China, 2012    153

Figure 28: Japan: Imports of lithium carbonate, hydroxide & oxide and combined LCE, 2005 to 2012     191

Figure 29: World: Leading exporters of lithium carbonate, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012    231

Figure 30: World: Leading importers of lithium carbonate, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012    233

Figure 31: World: Leading exporters of lithium hydroxide and oxides, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012    235

Figure 32: World: Growth in consumption of lithium, 2000 to 2012    239

Figure 33: World: Consumption of lithium by end-use, 2012    240

Figure 34: World: Consumption of lithium by end-use, 2000 to 2012     241

Figure 35: World: Consumption of lithium by end-use, 2000 to 2012     241

Figure 36: World: Estimated consumption of lithium by country/region, 2002, 2007 and 2012     244

Figure 37: World: Consumption of lithium by product, 2012     245

Figure 38: World: Consumption of lithium by type, 2000 to 2012     247

Figure 39: World: Historical and forecast consumption of lithium by end-use, 2007 to 2017     248

Figure 40: World: Forecast consumption of lithium by form, 2007, 2012 and 2017     252

Figure 41: Specific energy and energy density of rechargeable batteries    253

Figure 42: Lithium-ion battery schematic    254

Figure 43: Lithium metal polymer battery schematic    256

Figure 44: Lithium-sulphur cell schematic    257

Figure 45: Lithium-air cell schematic    258

Figure 46: World: Production of rechargeable batteries1, 1995 to 2012     259

Figure 47: World: Production of rechargeable batteries1, 1995 to 2012     260

Figure 48: World: Rechargeable lithium battery production by country, 2000 to 2012     260

Figure 49: Lithium-ion battery materials value chain    263

Figure 50: World: Production of lithium cathode materials by type, 2000 to 2012    264

Figure 51: World: Market for rechargeable lithium batteries by end-use, 2002, 2007 and 2012     268

Figure 52: World: Market for rechargeable lithium batteries by end-use, 2012     269

Figure 53: World: Production of rechargeable batteries and consumption of lithium, 2000 to 2012    276

Figure 54: World: Market for rechargeable lithium batteries by end-use, 2002 to 2017     279

Figure 55: World: Ceramic tile production by region, 2007 and 2012     288

Figure 56: World: Sanitaryware production by region/country, 2010    291

Figure 57: World: Production of tableware by country/region, 2008    293

Figure 58: USA: Shipments of cookware, bakeware and kitchenware, 2001 to 2010    295

Figure 59: World: Shipments of white goods by region, 2000 to 2020    296

Figure 60: World: Year-on-year growth in construction spending and GDP, 2000 to 2017    298

Figure 61: World: Production of lubricating grease by additive type, 2011     312

Figure 62: World: Production of lubricating grease by type, 2000 to 2012    313

Figure 63: World: Production of lithium grease by region/country and by type,  2000 and 2011     314

Figure 64: World: Output of automobiles by region, 2000 to 2012    318

Figure 65: World: Deliveries of commercial aircraft, 2000 to 2012    318

Figure 66: World: Shipbuilding deliveries, 2000 to 2012    319

Figure 67: World: Relative industrial and transport output and lithium grease production, 2002 to 2011    320

Figure 68: World: Production of grease and consumption of lithium, 2000 to 2012    321

Figure 69: World: Estimated production of glass by type, 2012    326

Figure 70: World: Production of container glass by region/country, 2012    326

Figure 71: World: Consumption of glass packaging by region, 2011    327

Figure 72: World: Production of continuously cast steel by region, 1998 to 2012     335

Figure 73: World: Capacity for synthetic rubber production by country/region, 2012    340

Figure 74: World: Capacity for BR, ESBR and SSBR rubber by country/region, end-2011    341

Figure 75: World: SBC capacity by region/country, end-2010    341

Figure 76: World: Production of synthetic rubber by region, 1996 to 2011     342

Figure 77: World: Consumption of synthetic rubber by type, 2012    345

Figure 78: World: consumption of BR by end-use, 2010    346

Figure 79: World: Consumption of SBC by region/country, 2010    347

Figure 80: Consumption of SBC by end-use, 2007    347

Figure 81: World: Production of absorption chillers, 2003 to 2012    352

Figure 82: World: Consumption of lithium bromide in air treatment, 2001 to 2012    356

Figure 83: Specific energy and energy density of primary batteries    362

Figure 84: Primary and secondary battery gravimetric energy density    365

Figure 85: World: Production of primary lithium batteries by country, 1998 to 2012     366

Figure 86: Primary lithium battery schematics    370

Figure 87: World: Demand for lithium metal in primary batteries, 2000 to 2012    376

Figure 88: World: Aluminium output by type and lithium consumption, 2000 to 2012    383

Figure 89: World: Consumption of alkyd-based paints and coatings, 2010    390

Figure 90: Development of Al-Li alloys    392

Figure 91: World: Deliveries of commercial aircraft and lithium consumption, 2007 to 2019    399

Figure 92: Price history of lithium carbonate, 1990 to 2012    408

Figure 93: Compound annual prices of lithium minerals, 2000 to 2013     411

Figure 94: Prices for technical-grade lithium carbonate, 1999 to 2012     414

Figure 95: Prices for battery-grade lithium carbonate, 1999 to 2012     415

Figure 96: Comparison of lithium hydroxide and lithium carbonate prices, 2000 to 2012     418

Figure 97: Japan: Quarterly average import value of lithium hydroxide from the USA, 2008 to 2012     419

Figure 98: World: Forecast nominal prices for technical-grade lithium carbonate, 2012 to 2017     423

Figure 99: World: Forecast real prices for technical-grade lithium carbonate, 2012 to 2017     424

For further information on this report, please contact Robert Baylis (rbaylis@roskill.co.uk).

SOURCE Roskill Information Services

 

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Satellite ultra-broadband in Europe & Africa

Posted on 15 May 2013 by Africa Business

NEW YORK, May 15, 2013 /PRNewswire/ — Reportlinker.com announces that a new market research report is available in its catalogue:

Satellite ultra-broadband in Europe & Africa

http://www.reportlinker.com/p01029508/Satellite-ultra-broadband-in-Europe–Africa.html#utm_source=prnewswire&utm_medium=pr&utm_campaign=Broadband

In this report, IDATE identifies the latest developments and major trends in the broadband and ultra-fast broadband markets. After a detailed analysis of the various terrestrial networks and their coverage, it examines satellite technology and the opportunities for positioning it as a complementary service to terrestrial networks to reduce the digital divides that currently exist in Europe and Africa.

Region: Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, TurkeyAfrica: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eriteria, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Contents • Part 1

Recalling the objectives of the Digital Agenda

• Part 2

Status of broadband market in Europe

• Part 3

Status of ultra-broadband market in Europe

• Part 4

Status of satellite broadband market in Europe

• Part 5

Satellite operator strategies

• Part 6

IDATE’s assessment and market forecasts up to 2017

• Part 7

Introduction to Africa

• Part 8

Status of broadband market in Africa

• Part 9

Satellite operator strategies

• Part 10

IDATE’s assessment and market forecasts up to 2017

• In this report, IDATE identifies the latest developments and major trends in the broadband and ultra-fast broadband markets.

• After a detailed analysis of the various terrestrial networks and their coverage, it examines satellite technology and the opportunities for positioning it as a complementary service to terrestrial networks to reduce the digital divides that currently exist in Europe and Africa.

Recalling the objectives of the Digital Agenda 9• Digital Agenda objectives are being met for basic broadband 10• Objectives of national plans diverging from Digital Agenda for ultra-broadband 112. Status of broadband market in Europe 12• DSL network coverage is improving 13• Rural coverage still needs to progress 14• As a consequence of the DAE, bitrates are improving fast 15• Competition from mobile networks gathers pace 163. Status of ultra-broadband market in Europe 17• Migration to ultra-fast broadband continues on the fixed market… 18• Adoption among households remains low 19• LTE is now launched in most European countries 20• Mobile operators are now tackling the residential fixed market 21• Towards the era of the Gbps 224. Status of satellite broadband market in Europe 23• Some

Figures

on satellite broadband consumers 24• Satellite access solutions are highly competitive 25• Satellite access solutions are tailored to tackle under-served terrestrial markets 26• Full satellite triple-play packages can be proposed 27• 5. Satellite operator strategies in Europe 28• Eutelsat 29• SES 31• Avanti 33• 6. IDATE’s assessment and market forecasts for Europe 34• 7. Introduction to Africa 36• A market with several barriers to entry 37• The fast deployment of submarine cables is a game changer 38• On land, fibre backbone networks are also being deployed 39• Impact of fibre deployment on satellite bandwidth princing 40• 8. Status of broadband market in Africa 41• Africa has less than 5% of world users 42• Fixed broadband prices are unsustainable 43• Mobile telephony is becoming the entry point for Internet access 44• Mobile broadband is progressing rapidly 45• Mobile broadband pricing is decreasing 46• 9. Satellite operator strategies in Africa 47• YahSat 48• SES and Eutelsat 49• 10. IDATE’s assessement and market forecasts for Africa 50• IDATE’s assessement and market forecats up to 2017 51• Who are we? 52

Figures

• Figure 1: Fixed broadband penetration in Europe 10• Figure 2: Digital agenda objectives 11• Figure 3: Total DSL network coverage in Europe, end-2011 (% of population) 13• Figure 4: Rural DSL network coverage in Europe, end-2011 (% of population) 14• Figure 5: Fixed broadband lines by speed, 2008-2012 15• Figure 6: Fixed broadband lines by speed, January 2012 15• Figure 7: Total HSPA coverage in Europe, end of 2011 16• Figure 8: Rural HSPA coverage in Europe, end of 2011 16• Figure 9: FTTx network coverage, end-2011 18• Figure 10: FTTH/B adoption, YE 2012 19• Figure 11: Other FTTx technologies adoption, YE 2012 19• Figure 12: Timetable for LTE spectrum in Western Europe 20• Figure 13: Evolution of LTE coverage in Portugal following use of the 800 MHz band 20• Figure 14: HomeFusion service offered by Verizon Wireless 21• Figure 15: LTE service for homes offered by TeliaSonera 21• Figure 16: Evolution of fixed broadband technologies up to 2030 22• Figure 17: LTE-Advanced performance 22• Figure 18: Bandwidth consumption, per subscriber 24• Figure 19: Bandwidth consumption, by application 24• Figure 20: Evolution of satellite broadband offering for basic package 25• Figure 21 : Price change of a broadband satellite reception terminal 25• Figure 22: Positioning of some satellite broadband offerings in France(as of February 2013) 26• Figure 23: In the USA, ViaSat and Hughes tackle 26• Figure 24: Dishnet satellite triple-play packages being offered by Dish (based on HughesNet Gen4 service) in the USA 27• Figure 25: Satellite broadband terminal proposed by Eutelsat with TV reception capability 27• Figure 26: Ka-Sat coverage 29• Figure 27: Selected packages based on Ka-Sat 29• Figure 28: Evolution of Tooway subscriber base 30• Figure 29: Evolution of Tooway download speeds 30• Figure 30: Hybrid vision of SES 31• Figure 31: Broadband for communities (launched in 2011) 31• Figure 32: Evolution of ASTRA2Connect subscribers 32• Figure 33: Evolution of ASTRA2Connect download speeds 32• Figure 34: Avanti coverage in Europe (Hylas-1 satellite) 33• Figure 35: Satellite broadband packages distributed by irish distributor, Qsat (downlink speeds from 4 to 10 Mbps) 33• Figure 36: Forecast of residential subscriptions to a two-way ultrabroadband satellite solution in Europe, 2013-2017 35• Figure 37: Literacy rates in Africa 37• Figure 38: PC penetration in Africa 37• Figure 39: Evolution of submarine cable deployments in Africa 38• Figure 40: Map of terrestrial fibre backbones in Africa, YE 2012 39• Figure 41: E1 pricing for a selection of African countries, 2012 39• Figure 42: Excerpt from Seacom commercial brochure 40• Figure 43: Average evolution of bandwidth prices over 2009-2012 40• Figure 44: Fixed broadband access penetration in Africa, end 2012 42• Figure 45: Fixed broadband penetration compared with literacy rate 42• Figure 46: Price of fixed broadband subscriptions based on per capita GDP 43• Figure 47: African mobile penetration, as of YE 2012 44• Figure 48: Top 5 African mobile markets, at YE 2012 44• Figure 49: Status of 3G, as of February 2013 45• Figure 50: Top 5 African 3G markets, at YE 2012 45• Figure 51: Monthly broadband basket, YE 2011 46• Figure 52: YahClick coverage 48• Figure 53: Eutelsat IP Easy coverage 49• Figure 54: Satellite broadband packages being offered as of year-end 2012 by Get2Net (SES ASTRA2Connect) 49• Figure 55: Forecast of residential subscriptions to a two-way ultrabroadband satellite solution in Africa, 2013-2017 51• Table 1: Basic coverage national objectives, in selected countries 10• Table 2: Objectives of national broadband plans, in selected countries 11• Table 3: Electrification rates in Africa 37• Table 4: Selection of mobile broadband basket (prepaid handsetbased), YE 2011 46• Table 5: Array of speeds offered by Vox Telecom in South Africa and Coolink in Nigeria (as of February 2013) 488

To order this report:Broadband Industry: Satellite ultra-broadband in Europe & Africa

Contact Clare: clare@reportlinker.com
US:(339) 368 6001
Intl:+1 339 368 6001

 

SOURCE Reportlinker

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Redi Tlhabi interviews Banda & Ramphele on South 2 North

Posted on 15 May 2013 by Africa Business

This Friday on Al Jazeera’s new global talk show South 2 North, Redi Tlhabi interviews two remarkable African leaders: Joyce Banda, Malawi’s first female president, and Dr. Mamphela Ramphele, founder of Agang, South Africa’s new party political platform.

President Banda became only the second woman to lead an African country in April 2012, following the example of Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Time Magazine recently named Banda one of the most influential people in the world, while Forbes called her the most powerful woman in Africa in 2012.


Ramphele, a former vice-chancellor at The University of Cape Town and past managing director of The World Bank, was a co-founder of the Black Consciousness Movement with Steve Biko. In February 2013, she launched Agang, a new party political platform intended to challenge The African National Congress in South Africa.

What gender-related challenges have Banda and Ramphele had to overcome? Are there more opportunities for women in the political arena in Africa today? Do women do politics differently? Is there space developing for opposition politics in Africa?

Watch Redi ask the important questions on this week’s episode of South 2 North, which premieres at 19:30 GMT on Friday, 17 May 2013 and also screens Saturday at 14h30, Sunday 04h30 and Monday 08h30.

For more information, visit http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/south2north/, where all episodes are available to watch online.

You can also tweet your questions, comments and opinions to @AJSouth2North or find South 2 North on Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/pages/South-2-North/255419671252120.

Catch up on last week’s episode of South 2 North, where Redi discussed re-imagining Africa, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bMHlrLuaCC0.

 

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IMF Mission Concludes the 2013 Article IV Mission to the Republic of Congo

Posted on 14 May 2013 by Africa Business

BRAZZAVILLE, Republic of the Congo, May 14, 2013/African Press Organization (APO)/ An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Mr. Mbuyamu Matungulu visited Brazzaville during April 29–May 13, 2013, to conduct discussions for the 2013 Article IV consultations. The mission met with the Honorable Obami Itou, President of the Senate; the Honorable Koumba, Speaker of Parliament; State and Finance Minister Ondongo, Special Presidential Advisor Gokana, National Director of the BEAC Ondaye Ebauh, and other senior officials. It held discussions with development partners and representatives of the private sector, including members of the banking profession.

At the end of the mission, Mr. Matungulu issued the following statement:

“In 2012, real GDP growth rebounded to about 4 percent despite a marked decline in oil production. Activity in the non-oil sectors was robust, driven by a surge in public spending in response to the ammunitions depot explosion of March 2012. The brisk increase in spending put pressures on prices, bringing end-year inflation to 7.5 percent as domestic supply response was limited. Reflecting the high import content of increased government outlays, the external current account turned negative in 2012. Credit growth remained robust. The basic non-oil primary budget deficit increased considerably, stemming from the expansion of government spending. However, the deficit was smaller than projected, with domestically-funded investment outlays somewhat lower than anticipated.

“Real GDP growth is expected to strengthen to 5.8 percent in 2013 despite a further decline of oil production, underpinned by continuing strong activity in construction and public works, telecommunications, as well as a timid start of iron ore production. Inflation eased to a monthly average of -0.1 percent in January-February 2013, and is projected to remain subdued during the remainder of the year as pressures from the 2012 ammunitions explosions fallout gradually recede. While the current account is expected to improve, the country remains vulnerable to adverse changes in external conditions, particularly on terms of trade. Compared to the initial budget, the mission’s current fiscal projections for 2013 reflect a shortfall in oil revenue equivalent to 4.8 percent of non-oil GDP, a reduction in government spending, as well as much higher-than-anticipated payments on arrears to social sectors. While the basic non-oil primary budget deficit should be contained below the projected level, the build-up of government deposits with the central bank would likely be much lower than targeted under the 2013 budget. The mission urged stronger treasury management and discussed quarterly fiscal targets for the remainder of the year to minimize slippages.

“The authorities’ medium-term development agenda seeks to foster private sector development, facilitate economic diversification, and secure growth inclusiveness. It appropriately emphasizes preservation of macroeconomic stability, improvements in governance and transparency and in business conditions, as well as a scaling up of investment to begin closing large infrastructure and skills gaps, while seeking further gains in budget consolidation. The mission encouraged the authorities to expedite reforms to improve the quality of spending; and welcomed World Bank involvement in the efforts to improve the management of the public investment program and enhance the productivity of the development budget. It underscored accelerated implementation of World Bank-supported reforms to improve the business environment, including in financial sector; and to roll out envisaged social protection systems. Regarding the management of oil resources, the mission reiterated calls for early adoption by Parliament of the draft law on budget transparency and accountability, following the achievement last February of compliant status under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). As Congo moves ahead with the establishment of Special Economic Zones, the staff team urged caution. In particular, the mission encouraged the authorities to refrain from extending special fiscal incentives, and to focus instead on revamping infrastructure, including the inadequate electricity network, and advancing administrative facilitation. The staff team favored implementation of economy-wide reforms that improve the business environment for all so as to prevent abuses. It confirmed Congo’s low risk of debt distress but noted the need for continuing prudent borrowing policies to maintain long-term debt sustainability in the post-HIPC era.

“The mission discussed a medium- and long-term fiscal framework aimed at protecting spending from oil revenue volatility and ensuring budget and debt sustainability while supporting growth and guarding against the risks in the face of declining oil reserves. The framework makes provisions for scaled up investment and a buildup of net wealth that would sustain expenditures when oil resources are depleted. Under the agreed framework, nearly 65 percent of projected total oil revenue for 2013–2019 would be spent (two thirds of which on capital goods), and 35 percent saved; and the basic non-oil primary budget deficit would be limited to 36.1 percent of non-oil GDP by 2015.

“The authorities concurred with the need to improve coordination of economic policy management through development of appropriate reform-monitoring mechanisms. In this context, staff welcomed the government’s support to the ongoing review of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC)’s reserves pooling framework. Finally, the mission reminded the authorities of Congo’s legal obligations under Article VIII, Section 5, including the obligation to provide data to Fund staff on official holdings of foreign exchange.

“The mission wishes to express gratitude to the authorities for their hospitality. Upon its return to Washington D.C., the team will prepare a staff report to be discussed by the IMF’s Executive Board.”

 

SOURCE

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

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What Is Needed for Sustainable Energy for Africa?

Posted on 09 May 2013 by Africa Business

18 – 20 FEBRUARY 2014 | SANDTON CONVENTION CENTRE |

JOHANNESBURG SOUTH AFRICA | WWW.ENERGYINDABA.CO.ZA

AFRICA ENERGY INDABA APRIL 2013

What Is Needed for Sustainable Energy for Africa?

The African Development Bank is at the forefront of initiatives aimed at providing energy access, and providing energy availability to Africans.  The Bank’s Southern African Director; Dr Ebrahim Faal delivered a presentation at the 2013 Africa Energy Indaba in February 2013 along these lines.  He looked at Africa’s energy landscape and presented the topic, “Towards Providing Sustainable Energy in Africa”.  In this newsletter, we take a look at the important issues covered in his presentation.

While Africa has plenty of energy resources, its energy statistics are not good.  Eighty-percent of the world’s population without electricity lives in rural Sub-Saharan Africa where per capita consumption is only 124KW per year.  Ninety-three percent of Africa’s hydropower potential is untapped and less than 10% of Africa’s hydro-electric power potential has been exploited. Africa also has the highest solar irradiation in the world.

Access to energy is critical to economic growth and development, and is the key to the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs).  While two thirds of African economies are expected to grow around 6.2% this year, which is still below the 7% needed to make a sizeable dent in poverty levels, it is nevertheless remarkable.   Greater access to energy is needed in order for economies to grow at levels beyond 6.2% up to 7%.  Sustainable economic growth in Africa can only be realised through greater provision of energy access and availability.  If MDG related targets are to be met by 2015, access to energy needs to rise from the present low levels of 27%, to 64%. Dr Faal identified a number of key initiatives that need to be done in order to ensure a supply of sustainable energy in the African continent. These included:

· Governments in Africa need to enact energy policies that will produce reforms in the energy sector with regard to cost reflective tariffs that support vulnerable customers.

· The promotion of regional integration through NEPAD.

· The private sector needs to play an increasing role in energy infrastructure development.

· International finance institutions need to mobilise financial support;

· Implementation partnerships need to be crafted across development partners, governments, regions, between South-South, and between public & private sectors in order to accelerate and upgrade Africa’s infrastructure delivery.

Current African Development Bank projects include the following outcomes:

· Distributing electricity solutions in a number of rural electrification projects in Burkina Faso, Guinea and DRC.

· Working within some low-income countries in scaling gap renewable energy within the framework of climate investment funds, plus within the UN’s ‘Co-generation for Africa’ project.

· Projects for improving grid infrastructure and supply efficiency in on-going regional transmission projects, in Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Guinea, which will connect fragile states through to the other countries in the West Africa Power Pool and lay the foundation of leveraging the HEP potential of Guinea.

· Facilitation work that includes institutional capacity building and development of policy and regulatory frameworks for enhanced regional collaboration.

· Involvement in large-scale renewable energy projects, for example Inga HEP project in the DRC, and concentrated solar power 500 MW plant in Morocco, as well as wind and energy projects.

· Engaging with clients in energy planning and policies; the ADB has a wealth of experience in advisory services, and as such provides guidance and support in issues such as reforming regulatory frameworks, improving governance and creating an enabling environment for private sector development

· Developing innovative financial instruments to meet specific African challenges. For example in 2011 established a SEF [Sustainable Energy Fund] for Africa that provides SME’s in the energy sector with project preparation grants and growth capital through private equity vehicles. Another innovative instrument in the pipeline is the mobilisation of additional finance from sources such as African Central Bank Reserves, African Pension Funds, the African Diaspora, and high net worth individuals on the continent.

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Minister for Africa addresses UK-Djibouti Trade and Investment Forum

Posted on 08 May 2013 by Africa Business

 

LONDON, United-Kingdom, May 8, 2013/African Press Organization (APO)/ Minister for Africa addresses UK-Djibouti Trade and Investment Forum.

 

Minister for Africa, Mark Simmonds, today addressed the first ever UK-Djibouti Trade and Investment Forum.

 

The Forum was organised by Developing Markets Associates to promote opportunities in Djibouti to British businesses. Around 200 companies attended the event, which was led on the Djiboutian side by President Guelleh and a team of Ministers. In his remarks, the Minister for Africa highlighted the scale of the opportunities in Djibouti and the Government’s determination to support British businesses in participating in them.

 

Speaking today, Mr Simmonds said:

 

“I am delighted to have taken part in the excellent and well-attended UK-Djibouti Trade and Investment Forum. This marks a huge step forward in deepening ties between the UK and Djibouti, something I am determined to do after my visit to the country in February – the first substantive visit by a Foreign Office minister in recent memory. The Government of Djibouti has impressive plans to attract investment to the country, which is strategically located in the region, and British businesses must not lose out.”

 

Today’s event follows yesterday’s meeting between Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf of Djibouti and the Foreign Secretary in the margins of the Somalia conference, where they discussed priorities for rebuilding Somalia and bilateral issues, including the recent parliamentary elections and inclusion of the opposition party.

 

SOURCE

United Kingdom – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Multi-faceted consumer car market bucks economic trend, says Standard Bank South Africa

Posted on 06 May 2013 by Africa Business

The South African new car market is bucking the economic trend with sales increasing by 4.1% to 163 092 units during the first three months of 2013 when compared to the same period last year. This is despite tough economic conditions, with the South African Reserve Bank expecting GDP to grow by only 2.7% during 2013.

Sydney Soundy, head of Vehicle and Asset Finance at Standard Bank South Africa, says that the prosperity within the market is notable when compared to other sectors, which were feeling the brunt of reduced consumer spending and the cost pressure caused by higher inflation and fuel prices, among other factors.

“Consumers seem to be taking advantage of the low interest rate environment and clearly still have an appetite for secured credit,” Mr Soundy says.

Vehicle sales continue to be driven by passenger vehicles and individual purchases. As at February 2013 total vehicle instalment debtors and leases were made up largely by individuals, who made up 72% of the instalment and leases book.

Looking at the South African buyer reveals several interesting facts.

“The majority of people applying for vehicle finance are between the ages of 18 and 45, constituting 62.4% of the market. These consumers display the highest level of awareness about technical changes to vehicles taking place in the industry, the brand offerings available, the legislation and the financial offerings available to buyers,” Mr Soundy says.

He notes that manufacturers have reacted to this knowledgeable sector of the market by ensuring that their offerings are competitively priced and offer the features demanded. One of the results is a diversified market in which about 70 brands of passenger vehicle are available, offering customers a choice of around 2 500 variants.

“About 65% of consumers are purchasing cars that cost less than R200 000. Toyota, Hyundai and Volkswagen are some of the manufacturers that have met the need for buying economical vehicles, capturing 50% of the new car market in this segment,” he said. Smaller engine vehicles (<1.7 litres) have seen the biggest sales growth in recent times, growing by just under 12% in 2012 from 2011, compared to growth of 9% and 1% for medium (1.8 to 3 litres) and large (>3 litres) engine vehicles respectively.

Consumers have been addressing the monthly affordability of repayments for their vehicles of choice in different ways, including through financing vehicles over a longer period, using the Residual Value option on their finance deals, and varying the extent of deposits offered.

The advent of the National Credit Act has also seen finance contracts taken over longer terms, with the average contract for new vehicles now being just over 60 months. “The average settlement period for new vehicles however, is just over 40 months,” Mr Soundy says.

Applications with a residual value request have increased, with the overall percentage of applications received with residual values at around 13% in the first quarter of 2013, from just over 11% in 2012. Consumers are seeing the benefit of this finance option, in which the monthly installments are reduced due to a residual value.

In the first quarter of this year, Standard Bank South Africa has seen an increase in the number of vehicle finance applications; however the percentage of applications with deposits have declined, with more consumers seeking to finance vehicles without a deposit.

Mr. Soundy also notes that although the traditional installment sale agreement remains very popular, consideration for alternative financing options, such as rental and leasing options, is gaining traction.

“Astute consumers are well aware that a vehicle cannot be deemed an asset. They are shifting the risk of vehicle ownership and residual values, and the responsibility of disposing the vehicle at the end of the contract, to the financier.”

Looking ahead, Mr Soundy notes that certain factors this year may work against growth in new vehicles sales. These include the Rand exchange rate which could put pressure on vehicle prices, continuing high levels of consumer household debt, and the high level of households with impaired credit records. Increases in food prices, energy prices (both fuel and electricity), and transport costs, including toll fees, will also impact on consumers’ disposable income. Inflation will be under pressure to remain below the target of 6% in 2013, impacted largely by the depreciation of the Rand and higher fuel prices.

“The Rand is likely to remain sensitive to both domestic and global developments. This could have a negative knock-on effect on vehicle prices,” he says. “However, the effect of the exchange rate has not yet reflected in car sales. Last year, vehicle prices rose by only 2.2% year-on-year.”

Mr Soundy believes that the continuing current low interest rate environment and the competitive nature of the South African motor industry will provide potential boost for growth in the market.

He says that Standard Bank South Africa’s financing activities will continue to be based on responsible lending that takes into account cash flow optimisation for both personal and commercial customers.

“Regardless of the economic situation, we will continue to assist customers by developing and providing financial services that make the acquisition of vehicles, whether for private or corporate use, as easy as possible.”

Source: StandardBank.com

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Mergermarket highlights Global M&A Trends at Second Annual Investment Meeting

Posted on 30 April 2013 by Africa Business

–       CEE and Africa are gaining momentum –

 

About Mergermarket

Mergermarket, part of The Mergermarket Group, is an unparalleled, independent M&A intelligence tool used by the world’s foremost financial institutions to originate deals. It provides proprietary intelligence on potential deal flow, potential mandates and valuations via the world’s largest group of M&A journalists and analysts who have direct access to the most senior decision-makers and corporates.
Incorporated in December 1999 by founders Caspar Hobbs, Charlie Welsh and Gawn Rowan Hamilton, it has since become the fastest growing business in its sector. As well as expanding its coverage across Europe, Americas, Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, the company continues to launch ground-breaking products and services.
In August 2006 The Mergermarket Group was acquired by the Financial Times Group, publisher of the Financial Times newspaper and FT.com. FT Group is a division of Pearson plc, the international media group. For further information, please see: www.mergermarket.com

 

Dubai – 30 April, 2013 – Mergermarket, an independent mergers and acquisitions intelligence and data service, today participates in the second Annual Investment Meeting. AIM is a well-established international event, well placed to cater to the needs of fast growing developing economies.

While the world continues to grapple an economic crisis, Emerging Markets continue to grow and are leading the FDI recovery. AIM proves to be the right formula allowing the developing world to display their strengths and promote greater interaction and exchanges. The United Arab Emirates, a country with unprecedented and continuous growth, is the host of choice and initiator of this important event.

February’s ‘fortune-fortnight’ produced US$ 87.7bn -worth of mega-deals (deals above US10bn) towards global M&A so far this year – 124% higher than the US$ 70.7bn gained from mega-deals in Q1 last year, according to Mergermarket. The expected resurgence in M&A that these deals would produce hasn’t quite come to fruition – global M&A in 2013 to-date valued at US$ 496.7bn is down 12.7% compared to the US$ 569-worth of deals racked up in the same period of 2012. Deal volume is also behind last year at 22.6% from 3988 deals to 3085 deals so far this year.

The Americas M&A activity, mostly dominated by the US, is the only region to have witnessed year-on-year increases in deal value and also deal count from 2010 onwards.  Mergermarket expects US M&A to hold up this activity in 2013 as the country sees US$ 298.1bn-worth of deals announced so far this year, on par with the US$ 237.7bn accumulated in the same time last year.

CEE’s 2012 activity (US$ 127.6bn) was the third consecutive annual increase in deal value.  The region looks consistent with its progress in deal making this year too with Q1 showing increases in deal value every month – deals valued at US$ 28.3bn is up 61% compared to US$ 17.6bn during the same time in 2012. According to Mergermarket, two deals in particular have Influenced this total – the highest valued slots into Russia’s Mining sector where a 37.75% stake was acquired in gold mining company Polyus Gold International by two private investors in February for US$ 3.6bn. The second deal was in the most active global sector of Telecommunications – Tele2 Russia Telecom was acquired by Russian VTB Bank for US$ 3.6bn.

Following one of this year’s top global deals by value total deals for Africa are valued at US$ 14.9bn. This represents a 55.2% increase from the same time last year where deals totaled US$ 9.6bn.  The regions highest valued deal so far saw Eni East Africa was acquired by China National Petroleum for US$ 4.2bn.

Post-crisis global M&A has made an attempted recovery since the 2009 trough but values came at a standstill by the time we reached the end of 2012 (US$ 2,247.7bn) and ended at a similar level to how 2011 did (US$ 2,245.1bn).”

During the course of the year we have seen several signals that M&A activity was back and appetite and excitement by investors and M&A professionals have has increased, says Giovanni Amodeo, Global Editor in Chief of Mergermarket. “However, the Eurozone crisis, the issues in Cyprus and the slowdown in the GDP growth in some of the emerging market has not helped the M&A volume to pick up.  The increase in cross border activity, as shown by Megermarket is a good indication that companies are still looking for good acquisition targets in different continents.”


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BP TO INVEST MORE THAN R5-BILLION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Posted on 23 April 2013 by Africa Business

BP today announced plans to invest in excess of R5 billion in South Africa and Mozambique over the next five years in new and on-going infrastructure upgrade projects to improve business efficiency and assist Government’s objectives to enhance energy security and enable the transition to cleaner fuels.

During a visit to South Africa today, Iain Conn, BP Group Managing Director and Chief Executive of Refining and Marketing, said that BP was committed to pursuing operations and investments across Africa. In Upstream, BP is pursuing opportunities in Angola, Algeria, Namibia, Libya and Egypt. In Downstream, beyond today’s announcement about South Africa, BP is also making investments to improve and upgrade the fuel import infrastructure in neighbouring Mozambique.

In South Africa, an investment of close to R5 billion will be spent on various projects across the BP Fuels Value Chain including refinery, terminal and retail network assets. This is a sign of BP’s growing confidence in the South African economy as an attractive investment destination especially after the adoption of the National Development Plan (NDP) as the road map for the country.

Mr Conn stated that around half the investment will be spent in upgrading and modernising the refinery infrastructure at Sapref, a joint venture with Shell. The infrastructure upgrade will primarily be to comply with South Africa’s proposed clean fuels requirements.

In February 2013, the South African Minister of Finance Pravin Gordhan undertook to announce the support mechanism for biofuels and upgrade of refineries to encourage South Africa to produce cleaner fuels which are environmentally friendly.

“We anticipate that the remuneration mechanism will be finalised shortly as we have already started to invest in the project and our intent is to be ready to produce clean fuels in 2017,” said Mr Conn.

Part of the R5 billion investment is aimed at building and upgrading terminals to world-class facilities that are leading the industry in terms of safety, operational integrity and technology. BP’s investment will also ensure greater security of supply. An example of this investment is the new and recently-commissioned facility built in partnership with Sasol at Alrode outside Johannesburg. Once completed, this terminal will be the most modern and technologically advanced in Africa with high safety management systems and standards.

BP’s retail network will benefit from the announced investment which will improve customer experience. The conversion to a “best in class” convenience retail offering, in partnership with Pick n Pay, will see 120 Pick n Pay Express stores opened in the next five years across South Africa. Coupled with improvements to the BP Express convenience offering, the fuel forecourts will be upgraded with a standardised look.

Iain Conn emphasised that BP’s commitment is not only about the capital and commercial investment, it is also about being part of a South African community and continuing to contribute to the improvement of people’s lives through a focused transformation programme aligned with Government’s goal to create jobs, develop skills and build entrepreneurs, as well as achieve sustainable economic growth.

“This is part of our on-going efforts to be a good corporate citizen as we pursue our business objectives in all the markets in which we operate”, said Mr Conn.

BP has been at the forefront of transformation over a number of years. In 2001, BP became one of the first companies to form an empowerment initiative and this has resulted in cash pay-outs to BEE shareholders to the tune of R300 million.

Subsequently, Masana, a joint venture between BP and its BEE partners, was formed in 2005. This has been one of South Africa’s empowerment success stories which has doubled its growth since inception.

BP continues on pioneering the transformation journey with the latest hydrocarbon (crude oil) procurement initiative which invited and encouraged local previously disadvantaged enterprises to participate in a tender process.

A long standing support for skills development and quality education continues to be at the cornerstone of BP’s involvement in high school enrichment programmes, artisan to PhD support programmes, and general industry skills development for the previously disadvantaged. To this end, BP, as part of the South African Petroleum Industry Association (SAPIA), is involved in an industry-wide skills development initiative that will culminate in a Petroleum Institute which will assist the Southern Africa region.

Mr Conn reiterated that “the investments we are making in South Africa are not only a sign of confidence in the policy direction the country is taking, but they are also our commitment to all South Africans through the successful development of the energy infrastructure, market and associated skills and opportunities.”

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Ethiopia: Minority Regime’s Fiefdom Syndrome

Posted on 13 April 2013 by Africa Business

Sophia Tesfamariam

Ethiopia- Minority Regime’s Fiefdom Syndrome (Acrobat Reader .pdf)

In the past, I have written about the regime in Ethiopia, its incurable inferiority complex and crab mentality, its refusal to abide by international and bilateral Agreements it has signed, and from respecting international law, UN Security Council resolutions and most of all, from respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Successive Ethiopian regimes have presented themselves as being more “diplomatic”, “more sophisticated”, “peace loving” etc. etc. than others in the region and beyond. This delusional self assessment has prevented them from seeing themselves as they really are- weak, frightened and myopic.

The minority regime attempts to present itself as a law abiding member of the international community, and it abuses and undermines the very institutions that it hails in public. It does that, not because it has the diplomatic, economic or political prowess to do so, but because it relies on its handlers to cover up its crimes, and has employed and perfected certain ploys that it believes have served it well in the last 21 years. For brevity’s sake, I will list the regime’s favorite gimmicks used in both its international and domestic affairs. It will help readers understand its mental schema. In business, the term “Fiefdom Syndrome”[1] explains how certain toxic cliques have detrimental effects on a company’s health. Let us see the toxic TPLF cliques “Fiefdom Syndrome” and how it affects its handling of domestic and international issues.

1. Seeks Powerful Alliances

Ethiopia is a poor country that relies on donors for 60% of its national budget. Ethiopias handlers have been touting “11% economic growth” in Ethiopia, but sadly, despite the billions funneled into the country from various donors, Ethiopia remains one of the countries that will not be meeting the Millennium Development Goals in 2015, will not achieve food security or make any progress in the standard of living of its people. The recent World Bank Report found corruption ripe in Ethiopia’s economic, health, education, telecommunication, land and other sectors. 17 billion dollars have disappeared from the countries coffers. Gold reserves have mysteriously vanished from its bank vaults etc. etc.

Lacking economic and political power, the regime’s cadres are seen wheedling “their way into powerful circles”, ingratiating themselves to western powers and using it as a “weapon of choice”. The minority regime in Ethiopia, lacking confidence in its own abilities, lacking legitimacy in its own country, chooses to advance its domestic and international agendas by latching onto powerful nations such as France, the United States and the United Kingdom. From feeding its people, to managing its political affairs, to managing its economy, these nations and their tentacled subsidiaries, “advisors’, “consultants”, run the country and its government. For a nation that prides itself as being the only one not colonized in the past, it is today, practically the most colonized state in Africa.

There are many examples of how Ethiopia reaches out to its handlers in order to effectuate its political agendas. For example, when Ethiopia wanted to break the close and neighborly relations between Djibouti and Eritrea, it relied on the United States to use its leverage in Djibouti. Let us take a look at a US Embassy cable that best illustrates this. September 2006 cable “ETHIOPIA: DEPUTY MINISTER TEKEDA TALKS SOMALIA, REGIONAL ISSUES WITH DAS YAMAMOTO”, details the conversation between the then Deputy Minister Tekeda Alemu and US Ambassador Donald Yamamoto. The cable says:

“…The Government of Djibouti’s opposition to IGAD actions in Somalia are the result of its fear of Eritrean President Isaias, Tekeda said, as well as President Guelleh’s personal business interests with Eritrea. The Deputy Foreign Minister speculated that the Djiboutian leadership was worried that Eritrea would support Afari separatist movements, as Isaias had done successfully in Sudan, if Djibouti did not follow Eritrea’s lead in Somalia. Tekeda also told Yamamoto that Aweys and other CIC leaders had stopped in Djibouti to meet with President Guelleh on their way back from Libya the week before. Tekeda maintained that the GOD was “on the wrong path,” and added that Djibouti was not strong enough to take Ethiopia’s continued friendship and forbearance for granted…”

But that was not all. Here is the rest of it:

“…Tekeda urged that the USG speak frankly with Djibouti about its role in the region. He said that President Guelleh would pay attention to U.S. concerns given the importance to him of the U.S. military base in Djibouti. “He must be told to choose” whose side he wanted to take…”

I don’t know what Donald Yamamoto’s response was to Tekeda Alemu’s request to break up Djibouti-Eritrea relations, or what the US did, but in less than a year, Djibouti-Eritrea relations had soured and the two countries were on the brink of war.  US Ambassadors in the Horn and the US Ambassador at the United Nations were instrumental in getting sanctions regime against the State of Eritrea and the Djibouti-Eritrea issue was orchestrated in order to get “stand alone sanctions” against Eritrea.

2. Camouflage

If there is one gimmick that the regime in Ethiopia has perfected to date is the one of creating distractions, to divert attention away from itself, its domestic crimes against humanity,  and its lawlessness. These tactics involve, “emphasizing the inconsequential”, “sending someone off on a wild goose chase” or “deliberately triggering someone’s anxiety buttons”. The Djibouti-Eritrea is a perfect example. While the regime’s forces have violated international law, the Algiers Agreements, over two dozen Security Council resolutions on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border and have been occupying sovereign Eritrean territories for the last 12 years, with the help of their handlers, they exaggerated and escalated the non-existent Djibouti Eritrea border issue.

Instead of taking responsibility for the security of its citizens and others in its territories, the minority regime blames Eritrea for everything that happens in Ethiopia and beyond. Presenting itself as a peace loving regime, its cadres have scoped the globe tarnishing Eritrea’s image and that of its leadership, whilst committing untold crimes against its own people, committing genocides in the Gambela, Ogaden and Oromia regions of Ethiopia, advancing it ethnic cleansing policies against the Amhara under the cover of the “villagization” program etc. Its crimes and human rights violations are hidden from the world because it has “friends” in high places.

3. Invisible Walls

Actively instigating actions or creating counterproductive perceptions so that an argued directive will be, if not impossible, extremely difficult to implement. The minority regime in Ethiopia has come up with several gimmicks to advance its anti-Eritrea agendas and has no problem creating new ones when others fail. The call for dialogue with Eritrea while refusing to vacate from sovereign Eritrean territories, the acceptance “in principle” the final and binding decisions of the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission, the off again, on again 5 Point Peace Plan etc. are just a few examples of the “mazes and false pathways” that it has established in order to frustrate the peace process.

4. Strategic Noncompliance:

This tactic is the minority regime’s favorite. It agrees upfront to take action while having no intention of taking that action, or cooperating in order to buy time to find a way of avoiding taking action. For example, Seyoum Mesfin, the most frightened member of the Tigrayan clique ruling Ethiopia today came out swinging in the wee hours of 13 April 2002. He called a Press Conference and announced to the world that the decision of the Boundary Commission was fair and that it was final and binding. He also said that “ Badme and its environs” had been awarded to Ethiopia and that the international community should urge Eritrea to accept the ruling and allow for the speedy demarcation of the Eritrea Ethiopia border.

A few days later, when the ignominious cadre and his team read the documents and found out that Badme, the casus bellie for the Eritrea- Ethiopia border conflict had been awarded to Eritrea.  In this case, since it cannot easily refuse to accept the decision, in order to have the moral high ground, it ran to accept the decision before Eritrea, only to turn around and delay compliance. The regime has done everything to get out of its treaty obligations and has collaborated with internal and external forces to undermine the EEBC decision. That began the 11 year long attempts to amend, revisit and even reverse the EEBC’s final and binding delimitation decision began.

It employed the support of Eritrean mercenaries to undermine the EEBC’s decisions, and to confuse the matter. These self serving emasculated individuals  came up with stuff like “Transitional Justice”, “making Badme a no-man’s zone”, “making Badme a park to be enjoyed by both sides” etc. etc. Instead of standing up for the people of Eritrea and the sovereignty of Eritrea, these quislings worked with Meles Zenawi to weaken Eritrea’s legal position for a few stipends-they failed miserably.

The regime “sought powerful alliances” in its ongoing pressure on Eritrea. In order to force Eritrean into relinquishing rights to Badme, the minority also turned to its friends at the UN and at the US State Department. Meles Zenawi sought the help of Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, to create an “alternative mechanism”, because he wanted to get rid of the EEBC. Kofi Annan obliged by creating all types of obstacles and preventing the EEBC from carrying out its sole mandate of demarcating the Eritrea Ethiopia border. John Bolton, the then US Ambassador to the United Nations said that Jendayi Frazer, the incompetent former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, told him  that she wanted to  “reopen the 2002 decision” which “she had concluded was wrong” and wanted it to “award a major piece of disputed territory to Ethiopia”. Bolton said that he “was at a loss how to explain that to the Security Council”, so he didn’t.

Frazer wanted to adjust the line and she brought General George Fulford, who she figured could serve as a “technical facilitator” to the EEBC. He was one of the people who had accompanied her on her ill-advised and illegal trip to Badme, an occupied sovereign Eritrean territory. Frazer and Fulford introduced the “satellite technology” map at an EEBC meeting in the spring of 2006. General Fulford also “rather unwisely, wrote to Eritrea’s Legal Counsel that he was seeking operational latitude to shift the boundary by about 1Km”.

After waiting for over five years to demarcate the Eritrea-Ethiopia border in accordance with the EEBC’s final and binding decisions, the Boundary Commission decided to demarcate the border using coordinates on maps, “virtual demarcation”, closed its offices and left the area. Ethiopia continues to flout international law, the UN and African Union Charters and the EEBC’s delimitation and demarcation decisions. It has refused to accept the demarcation and continues to occupy sovereign Eritrean territories, including Badme.

5. Information Manipulation.

This is another favorite ploy used by the regime in its domestic and foreign policies. It has perfected the art of withholding, putting a spin on information, and covering up or giving false information. When the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission delivered its final and binding delimitation decision on 13 April 2002, the ignominies Seyoum Mesfin, then Foreign Minister of Ethiopia told Ethiopians that Badme and its environs had been awarded to Ethiopia. It was bold lie.

When the regime could not get the EEBC to change the decision, it sought to undermine the Commission and Meles Zenawi claimed, through a letter to Kofi Annan that the Commission’s work was in “terminal crisis”.  The EEBC responded to that the letter was “misconceived and misleading”. In its 7 October 2003 letter to Kofi Annan, the Commission wrote the following:

“…there is no “crisis”, terminal or otherwise, which cannot be cured by Ethiopia’s compliance with its obligations under the Algiers Agreement, in particular its obligations to treat the Commission’s delimitation determination as “final and binding” (article 4.15) and “to cooperate with the Commission, its experts and other staff in all respects during the process of … demarcation” (article 4.14)…

Needless to say, Ethiopia continued with its belligerence and the US led international community looked the other way.

Having the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital as well as the UN’s many tentacle organizations at its disposal, successive Ethiopian regimes, and most especially the current minority regime, have emasculated these organizations and prevented them from calling a spade a spade.  The wiki leak cables are replete with the lies and deceptions of the regime and its cadres, too many to mention in one sitting. For example, the regime keeps telling the world that the “root causes” for the Eritrea Ethiopia border conflict must be addressed in order for Ethiopia to comply with its treaty obligations and the Algiers Agreements. Yet, it has prevented the African Union and the United Nations from establishing the Commission in accordance with the Algiers Agreements. Article 3 of the Algiers Agreements says:

“…In order to determine the origins of the conflict, an investigation will be carried out on the incidents of 6 May 1998 and on any other incident prior to that date which could have contributed to a misunderstanding between the parties regarding their common border, including the incidents of July and August 1997…The investigation will be carried out by an independent, impartial body appointed by the Secretary General of the OAU, in consultation with the Secretary General of the United Nations and the two parties…The independent body will endeavor to submit its report to the Secretary General of the OAU in a timely fashion…The parties shall cooperate fully with the independent body…The Secretary General of the OAU will communicate a copy of the report to each of the two parties, which shall consider it in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Framework Agreement and the Modalities…”

The Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission delivered its final and binding delimitation and demarcation decisions on 13 April 2002 and 30 November 2007 respectively. 13 years since the signing of the Algiers Agreements and the Commission that is supposed to determine the origins of the conflict” has yet to be established. Why?

According to a 1 December 2005 Wikileak cable from Ethiopia which details a 25 November 2005 meeting between US’ Donald Yamamoto and African Union officials. The African Union seems to have made a unilateral decision to delay the formation of the Commission. The cable said:

“…Peace and Security Commissioner Djinnit said that the AU favors prioritization of Algiers Accord requirements and indicated that the AU does not believe the time is right for a study on the causes of war between the two countries, as provided for under Article 3…”

Judging from Ethiopia’s interference with the work of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union to get the latest US-Ethiopia engineered sanctions resolutions against the State of Eritrea and its people, there is no doubt that the AU was acting at the behest of the US and Ethiopia. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Algiers Agreement that allows the AU or the two parties to cherry pick parts to implement or delay. In addition, as one of the witnesses and guarantors of the Algiers Agreements, the African Union is morally and legally required to fulfill its obligations under the Agreements.

6. Discrediting opponents.

From its domestic opponents to all others, the regime in Ethiopia has used “personal attacks or irrelevant criticisms to create doubt about another person’s competence or credibility”. The frightened regime believes it can drain away the power of others by discrediting them. It seeks to find “dark secrets” and even create them with seductive traps, then expose them – it’s called ‘entrapment’. The regime has labeled opposition members, journalists and Ethiopian activists as being “terrorists” and has accused Eritrea of committing “terrorist acts”.

In its quest to dismember and weaken Somalia, the regime invaded and occupied Somalia in 2006. While it publicly accused Eritrea of not supporting the Transitional National Government (TNG) in Somalia, it undermined all the TNG leaders, used them in its agenda to sever Somalia and then dumped them. Here are some examples of Ethiopian consistent undermining of all of Somalia’s leadership:

§ “…Meles said that Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Prime Minister Gedi has “outlived his purpose” and is not the right person for the primary job now of ensuring an inclusive political process. The removal of Gedi would best be an outcome of the National Reconciliation Congress. Meles, Belliard said, agreed that there needs to be more Hawiye in the government, including in the security services…”-(Meles Zenawi 2007)

§ “…Tekeda said that Ethiopia’s objective for the upcoming October 27-29 IGAD Summit in Nairobi was “to soften Yusuf up…and put him in a cage.” He said that “either Yusuf will come out of the summit as a ceremonial president or he will be jettisoned.” Tekeda hoped that the summit would convince Yusuf that he cannot continue conducting business as usual with Yusuf only serving his Majerteen clan interests. Tekeda stated that there was now absolute consensus within the Ethiopian government that President Yusuf can no longer continue to be an obstacle to political progress in Somalia…Tekeda said that Yusuf was “an old man with no capacity,” and that he was a liability. The only question that remains is what can be done to limit the damage he can do. Tekeda said Yusuf could continue as President if he agreed to become a figure head, but if Yusuf does not listen, then he must leave… Tekeda revealed that in the previous weeks he had met secretly with ARS/Djibouti head Sheikh Sharif to discuss the integration of the ARS into the TFG”-( Tekeda Alemu on Abdulahi Yusuf -2008)

§ “…Tekeda suggested that the presidency was too high for ARS/Djibouti head Sheikh Sharif, but that Sharif as prime minister was possible. He added that Sharif should have some role in the government because he had some level of acceptance and credibility among Somalis. Tekeda noted that he had just gotten off the phone with Sharif, and that their discussions over the formation of a unity government were continuing. He also said that Sharif and the opposition would go to Nairobi to participate in the summit. Tekeda declined to name possible replacements for Yusuf…”- (Tekeda Alemu on Sheikh Sharif 2008)

 

§ “…Asked by Special Envoy for Somalia John Yates if Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein “Nur Adde” was capable of governing, Meles said only “no.” Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Abdisalan Aden had the right clan credentials (Habr Gedr/Ayer) but no power base of his own. Meles acknowledged, however, that “you can talk to him” and “he’s very useful.” Meles agreed with A/S Frazer that ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif might be a Trojan horse for more radical Islamists…”- (Meles Zenawi on Sheikh Sharif 2008)

 

§ “…Questioned about CIC leaders, Meles observed that with its defeat, the CIC had now lost its “aura of continued victory.” Whereas the Ayr sub-clan had been the CIC’s primary backer, CIC Executive Committee Chairman Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was Abgaal and now wielded little influence…”- (Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of Ethiopia-2007)

 

With Ethiopian officials serving as US advisors in the region, it is no wonder then that US policy for the Horn of Africa remains bloody, callous and incoherent.

The minority regime and its handlers have spent millions in targeted vilification and defamation campaigns against the State of Eritrea, its leadership and its people-especially the tight knit Diaspora population. The distortions and lies propagated by some Eritrean quislings in its employ have only strengthened the unity and resolve of the people. Today, members fo the Eritrean Quislings League and their sponsors are found resorting to criminal activities. For example, one of the regime’s mercenaries was caught vandalizing and destroying the Eritrean Community Center in Oakland, CA. Three Eritrean Community Centers in Stockholm, Sweden were burnt to the ground in February 2013. Its mercenaries have “occupied” and “vandalized” Eritrean Embassies and several individuals are now facing criminal charges. These acts of desperation continue and unless the United States and European governments conduct serious investigations into the regime’s activities, these crimes will escalate.

7. Occupation.

The regime wrongly believes that by marking territory and maintaining a physical presence, it can force its opponents to “dialogue” and “negotiations”. By occupying Somalia and imposing its will on the leaders, it seeks to project its rule on the people of Somalia. For over a decade now it has occupied sovereign Eritrean territories and has employed various gimmicks, including the 5-Point Plan (as advised by its friends in the UK) and “agreeing in principle” to accept the Boundary Commission’s decisions, to buy time and find ways to reverse the final and binding decision. There can be no dialogue with a regime that has occupied sovereign Eritrean territories, including Badme, in violation of international law, the African Union and United Nation’s Charters. Ethiopia’s occupation must end.

So far the international community has not taken any punitive actions against you and that has emboldened you to act irrationally and erratically, making you more dangerous to peace in the region.  The Security Council has an obligation to enforce the Algiers Agreement and the EEBC’s final and binding decision and so far it has failed to do so. Under international law, the UN Security Council does not have the option of non-action; it cannot shirk off its responsibilities to UN member states like Eritrea forever. Sooner or later they will have to act. I say they should act now to avert another humanitarian disaster.

The international community in general, and the witnesses and guarantors in particular, do not have the option to just wash their hands off like a bunch of Pontius Pilates, they too have legal obligations to fulfill. Moreover, their inaction will undermine the integrity and efficacy of the UN System, not to mention the effect their inaction will have on the confidence of member states in its ability to resolve conflicts and ensure international peace in the future, which today is very low.

Furthermore, they cannot expect Eritreans to do nothing; remain perpetually patient and magnanimous while Eritrea’s security is at risk and Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is being violated by Ethiopia. Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes Eritrea’s inherent right of self-defense.  Article 51 of the UN Charter clearly states the following:

“…Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security…”

Eritrea’s inherent right to self defense is justified under international law and the UN Charter:

  1. There is an armed attack/occupation. Ethiopia’s army is occupying sovereign Eritrean territories, including Badme for the last 13 years since the EEBC delivered its final and binding delimitation decision.
  1. There is no practicable alternative or it is demonstrably unavailable. The authority, the UN Security Council, which has the legal powers to stop or prevent the infringement, has so far refused to take any deterrent actions against your regime.  The UNSC has instead chosen to appease the minority regime by allowing its open defiance of international law and over two-dozen Security Council resolutions on the Eritrea Ethiopia border.
  1. There is urgent necessity. There are Eritreans who have been forced to live outside their villages. The Eritrea Ethiopia border has been delimited and demarcated and today, the only issue is the Ethiopian occupation of sovereign Eritrean territories, which cannot go on forever.

For the 3 reasons mentioned above and more, Eritrea has the right to liberate her sovereign territories and will not seek permission or approval from those who did not fulfill their legal obligations.

8. Shunning.

This is a tactic used by the regime to isolate Eritrea diplomatically and politically. By labeling Eritrea as the “spoiler” and refusing to allow Eritrea’s participation in international forums, by throwing tantrums at the UN and at the US State Department, the frightened regime has sought various ways to isolate Eritrea and muffle her voice. For some reason, despite its repeated calls for dialogue with Eritrea, the regime refuses to allow Eritrea’s participation at the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)…go figure!

There are other ugly traits of the TPLF regime in Ethiopia that could have been mentioned, but these will suffice for today. For those who are wondering why the regime chooses to employ gimmicks and tactics, the answer is quite simple. The minority regime in Ethiopia is illegitimate and lacks the support of its own people. It is “propped up” by western governments who have decided that it fulfills their agendas in the region. The mercenary regime does not have the financial or other resources to play the appointed Viceroy in the region, so it relies completely on its western sponsors to maintain its brutal grip on the Ethiopian people- and now the Somali people too. It is a regime driven by anger, fear and frustration. Its inferiority complex adds to its inability to achieve its domestic and international goals on its own-always at the mercy of its handlers.

There are three tactics in dealing with those suffering from the “Fiefdom Syndrome”:

· Refuse to play the game: It takes two to tango, and if you (and others) won’t play they may have to give up.

· Name the game: Exposure, so everyone knows the game, is a great way of neutralizing tricksters.

· Change the game: Taking control yourself allows you to reframe and redirect the energy of the situation

Know thy enemy…

Ethiopia must withdraw and the occupation of sovereign Eritrean territories must end now!

The rule of law must reign over the law of the jungle!

 


[1] Phrase coined by Robert J. Herbold, COO of Microsoft, senior executive who has held several positions during a 26-year career at Proctor & Gamble. He is now president of the Herbold Group LLC.

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