Zero tariffs can open doors, but they cannot fill containers. That is the central challenge facing African exporters as China extends zero-tariff treatment to imports from 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic relations.
The policy, implemented from 1 May 2026, is one of the most significant trade openings China has offered to the continent. It follows an earlier move in December 2024 to grant zero-tariff treatment on all tariff lines to 33 African least-developed countries, and now extends the arrangement to larger and more diversified economies such as Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa [1].
For Africa, the offer matters. China is already the continent’s largest trading partner. In 2025, China-Africa trade reached about $348bn, up 17.7% year on year, setting a new record. But beneath the headline figure lies a structural problem: China’s exports to Africa rose to about $225bn, while its imports from Africa reached about $123bn, leaving a large and widening imbalance [2].
This is why the zero-tariff offer should not be judged only by how much trade increases. The more important question is whether African economies can use the opening to change what they export, how they export it, and how much value they retain before goods leave the continent.
Africa does not lack products with potential. Coffee from Ethiopia, cocoa from West Africa, citrus and wine from South Africa, avocados from Kenya, sesame from Tanzania, leather from Ethiopia, seafood from coastal states, and minerals from across the continent all have room to grow in China’s market. Rising Chinese consumer demand for high-quality food, beverages and niche products creates new opportunities for African producers.
But market access is only the first step. Export success depends on phytosanitary approvals, customs procedures, cold-chain logistics, packaging, certification, branding, reliable supply volumes and the ability to meet consumer expectations. These are not marginal technical issues. They are the real infrastructure of export competitiveness.
Kenya’s avocado exports to China show what is possible when product approval, private-sector coordination and market demand come together. Ethiopia’s coffee exports also illustrate the potential of China’s changing consumer market. But these examples should not lead to complacency. They show that African firms can win in China, but also that winning requires preparation.
The risk is that zero tariffs may increase the volume of primary commodity exports without changing the structure of trade. That would be a missed opportunity. UNCTAD’s Economic Development in Africa Report 2024 notes that crude oil alone accounts for more than 20% of Africa’s exports, while the continent’s top ten export products make up almost half of all exports. More recent UNCTAD data show that primary goods accounted for 76.8% of Africa’s merchandise exports in 2024, underlining the continent’s continued dependence on commodities [3].
A tariff preference cannot by itself solve this problem. If Africa exports more raw beans, raw minerals and unprocessed agricultural products, the continent may earn more in the short term but remain locked into a familiar pattern: low value addition, limited industrial employment and vulnerability to commodity-price shocks.
The real opportunity lies elsewhere. China’s zero-tariff offer should become a trigger for African countries to strengthen export readiness. That means moving from market access to production capacity, from raw exports to processed goods, and from isolated national efforts to regional value chains.
Three priorities stand out.
The first is standards. Many African firms, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, struggle not because there is no demand for their products, but because they cannot consistently meet foreign market requirements. Sanitary and phytosanitary rules, labelling requirements, traceability systems and product testing facilities are now central to trade. Export-promotion agencies, chambers of commerce and governments should treat standards compliance as a core industrial policy tool.
The second is logistics. A tariff advantage can quickly disappear if goods are delayed at borders, lose quality in transit or face high transport costs. Perishable exports such as fruit, seafood, meat and flowers require cold-chain systems, efficient ports, reliable air cargo and predictable customs procedures. The World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index is designed precisely to measure such bottlenecks in customs, infrastructure, shipment reliability, logistics services and tracking capacity.
The third is value addition. Africa should not approach China’s zero-tariff offer simply as a chance to sell more raw materials. The goal should be to expand processing, packaging, branding and industrial employment on the continent. Agro-processing zones, testing laboratories, export-finance instruments, digital trade platforms and industrial parks will matter as much as tariff schedules.
This is also where the African Continental Free Trade Area becomes important. If every African country tries to export to China on its own, the benefits of zero tariffs may remain fragmented. But if AfCFTA is used to build regional production systems, pool supply, harmonise standards and connect producers with processors and logistics hubs, China’s market could become an external demand engine for African value chains.
The potential is significant. World Bank research estimates that AfCFTA could increase Africa’s total exports by almost 29% by 2035, while intra-African exports could rise by more than 81% [4]. That matters because Africa’s challenge is not only to reach China’s market, but to organise production at a scale large enough to compete in it. For example, one country may produce agricultural inputs, another may have processing capacity, a third may provide port access, and a fourth may offer trade finance or certification services. AfCFTA can help connect these advantages. China’s zero-tariff offer can then support a continental production strategy rather than a set of disconnected bilateral export opportunities.
There is also a broader global context. Protectionism is rising, and African exporters face increasing uncertainty in traditional markets. In 2025, concerns over new US tariffs pushed several African governments to look more seriously at market diversification and faster AfCFTA implementation. Reuters reported that African leaders were accelerating efforts to strengthen continental trade, while noting that only part of the continent was actively trading under AfCFTA despite its promise [5].
In that environment, China’s offer gives African countries an additional route to diversify exports. But diversification should not mean replacing one dependency with another. The strategic goal should be to expand Africa’s options, increase its bargaining power and retain more value within African economies.
China also has a role to play. If the policy is to support long-term development, cooperation should move beyond tariff removal. Practical support in customs facilitation, e-commerce access, logistics, quality inspection, vocational training, industrial investment and buyer-supplier matching will be crucial. Buying more African goods matters; helping African firms become more competitive matters even more.
For African policymakers, the task is equally clear. They should identify products with realistic potential in China’s market, support firms in meeting standards, invest in logistics and processing, and use AfCFTA to build regional supply capacity. This requires coordination between trade ministries, agriculture ministries, customs authorities, private firms, banks and regional institutions.
Zero tariffs are therefore not the end of the story. They are the beginning of a test. The countries that benefit most will not simply be those with the largest resource endowments. They will be those that can organise producers, meet standards, move goods efficiently, build brands and process more value at home. China has opened the door wider. Africa’s challenge now is to decide whether it will walk through that door as a supplier of raw commodities, or as a more competitive producer of value-added goods. China’s zero-tariff offer is an opportunity. But its real significance will depend on Africa’s export readiness, and on whether market access can be turned into industrial capacity.
References:
- Xinhua, “China implements historic zero tariffs for all African nations with diplomatic ties”, The State Council the People’s Republic of China, May 1, 2026, https://english.www.gov.cn/policies/policywatch/202605/01/content_WS69f45e35c6d00ca5f9a0ac01.html. Accessed 2026-05-08.
- GERALD IMRAY, “China has now dropped tariffs on imports from every African country except 1”, AP news, April 21, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/china-tariffs-africa-trade-us-7da631f9be17069ec92e1d7f432058d7. Accessed 2026-05-08.
- UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2024: Unlocking Africa’s Trade Potential: Boosting Regional Markets and Reducing Risks, Chapter 2, 2024. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/aldcafrica2024_ch2_en.pdf
- World Bank, The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/216831595998182418/pdf/The-African-Continental-Free-Trade-Area-Economic-and-Distributional-Effects.pdf
- Colleen Goko and Libby George, “ ‘We are on our own’- Africa looks within to weather growing global tariff turmoil”, Reuters, July 18, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/we-are-our-own-africa-looks-within-weather-growing-global-tariff-turmoil-2025-07-18/. Accessed 2026-05-10.
Yizhou He is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, China, and Deputy Director of the Institute of Central African Studies. She is also a master’s supervisor and associate editor of the Journal of African Studies (CSSCI-indexed). Her research focuses on development studies, regional economic development, China-Africa cooperation and African development.
University profile link:
https://mypage.zjnu.edu.cn/HYZ4/zh_CN/index.htm
University website: